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Abstract: 
Common ownership by the Chinese State caused a stir in Europe recently. During its 
review of a joint venture involving a Chinese nuclear power company, the European 
Commission (“Commission”) held that it would treat all Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in the energy sector as a single entity. This decision carries 
significant legal and practical implications for both businesses and the regulator. It 
also contradicts the Commission’s previous approach to European SOEs. In this 
Article, I argue that the legal framework under the E.U. Merger Regulation (EUMR) 
is unsuited to deal with the anticompetitive effects of state ownership. While the 
delineation of the boundary of an undertaking is a prerequisite for merger review, 
ownership and control are not absolute. Importantly, the extent to which the 
coordination by the Chinese State has lessened competition is a quantitative question, 
rather than a qualitative one. Consequently, a bright-line approach to defining an 
undertaking is both over and under-inclusive. To address the European Union’s 
dilemma in handling Chinese SOEs, I propose that the Commission should view 
national security review as a complement to its merger review. The optimal regulatory 
response to Chinese acquisitions hinges not only on economics, but also, perhaps 
more importantly, on politics.  
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Introduction 
 
Common shareholding has recently caused an uproar in the United States. Some 
academic papers have shown that horizontal shareholding by U.S. institutional 
investors facilitates collusion and raises prices in industries such as the airline and 
banking sectors.1 These findings caused alarm in the antitrust community and have 
led prominent scholars to call for legal action against anticompetitive horizontal 
shareholding.2 On the other side of the Atlantic, common ownership has also caused a 
stir. However, what concerned European policymakers was not financial institutions, 
but rather the Chinese State. Since the start of the Great Recession, the European 
Union has experienced a significant surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
China. From 2011 to 2015, annual Chinese FDI in Europe averaged more than EUR 
10 billion, compared to an average of EUR 1 billion annually in the previous five 
years.3 The latest figure from the Rhodium Group shows that in 2015 alone, Chinese 
companies invested EUR 20 billion in the European Union, a forty-four percent 
increase from the previous year.4 This figure further rose to EUR 35 billion in 2016, 
another seventy-seven percent increase from 2016.5  
 
Such a large influx of capital into Europe alarmed European regulators. Some were 
concerned about strategically—and politically—motivated takeovers by Chinese 
firms, 6  particularly those in which the Chinese government holds a controlling 
interest—entities known as state-owned enterprises (SOEs).7 Indeed, several features 
of Chinese State ownership present significant challenges for antitrust enforcement. 
China is the world’s second-largest economy, and it also has an unusually large state-
owned sector.8 According to the Chinese Ministry of Finance, as of 2013, China has 
                                                
1 E.g., José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 
J. FIN. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427345; José Azar, Sahil 
Raina & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2710252.  
2 E.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1301–14 (2016); Jonathan B. 
Baker, Overlapping Financial Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My 
Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 212 (2016); Eric A. Posner, Fiona 
Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional 
Investors, ANTITRUST L. J. (forthcoming), 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/FionaScottMorton/documents/COpolicyALJ.pdf. 
3 Thilo Hanemann & Mikko Huotari, A New Record Year for Chinese Outbound Investment in Europe, 
MERCATOR INST. FOR CHINA STUD. 3 (Feb. 2016), 
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/COFDI_2016/A_New_Record_Year_for_C
hinese_Outbound_Investment_in_Europe.pdf  
4 Id.  
5 Thilo Hanemann & Mikko Huotari, Record Flows And Growing Imbalances: Chinese Investment in 
Europe in 2016, MERICS PAPERS ON CHINA 3 (Jan. 2017), http://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_Merics_COFDI_EU_2016.pdf  
6  See John W. Miller, Chinese Companies Embark on Shopping Spree in Europe, WALL ST. J., 
(June 6, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704355304576214683640225122 
(citing examples of some individuals in the E.U. who are unsure of whether Chinese investment is a 
positive or a negative); see also Maaike Okano-Heijmans & Frans-Paul van der Putten, Europe Needs 
to Screen Chinese Investment, E. ASIA F. (Aug. 18, 2009) (raising concern that commercially motivated 
investments by Chinese SOEs may be used to pursue political goals in the future). 
7 For purposes of this article, SOEs are defined broadly to not only include those that are wholly- or 
majority-owned by the State, but also those upon which the State can exercise decisive influence 
through its control of voting rights, assets, or contract, despite a lack of majority ownership.  
8 The World Bank in China, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview (last 
updated Mar. 28, 2017); Scott Cendrowski, China’s Global 500 Companies Are Bigger than Ever-and 
	   4 
about 150,000 SOEs with a combined assets of USD $16.8 trillion. 9  A recent 
economic study estimated that SOEs account for thirty-five percent of China’s GDP.10 
Backed by cheap government financing and state support, Chinese SOEs are 
venturing abroad and becoming dominant players in China’s outbound investment. 
Meanwhile, China applies a centralized model to manage its vast state assets, and 
most major industrial SOEs are supervised by the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC).11 This suggests that an extensive amount of 
Chinese State assets are managed under one roof, with SASAC as the world’s largest 
controlling shareholder.12 Moreover, SASAC desires to dominate a few key sectors 
closely linked to national security and the lifelines of the economy, and to maintain a 
strong presence in several pillar industries.13 This arrangement raises suspicion about 
the independence of Chinese SOEs under SASAC’s control. Even worse, Chinese 
SOEs have long been beset by problems such as opaque organization structure, lack 
of sound corporate governance, and pervasive control by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).14   
 
The increased vigilance surrounding Chinese investment coincided with the 
Commission’s tightening of scrutiny over merger transactions involving Chinese 
SOEs. Since 2011, the Commission has applied a “worst-case scenario” approach 
when reviewing merger transactions involving Chinese SOEs. 15 Under this cautious 
                                                                                                                                      
Mostly State-Owned, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-global-500-
government-owned/  
9 ARTHUR R. KROEBER, CHINA’S ECONOMY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 99 (2016).  
10 Id. at 101. 
11 Certainly, not all Chinese SOEs are supervised by SASACs. For example, State-owned financial 
institutions are supervised by the China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, and China Securities Regulatory Commission. There are also SOEs whose supervisory 
authorities are in individual central government ministries other than SASAC, such as the Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. OECD 
WORKING GRP. ON PRIVATISATION AND CORP. GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED ASSETS, STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISE IN CHINA: REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE 8 (2009). 
12 Marcos Aguiar et al., SASAC: China’s Megashareholder, BCG PERSPECTIVES (Dec. 1, 
2007), http://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/globalization_strategy_sasac_chinas_megasha
reholder. 
13 See Guanyu Tuijin Guoyou Ziben Tiaozheng he Guoyou Qiye Zhongyue Zhidao Yijiande Tongzhi (
关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组指导意见的通知) [Guiding Opinion on Promoting the 
Adjustment of State-Owned Capital and the Reorganization of State-Owned Enterprises] (promulgated 
by St. Council, Dec. 5, 2006, effective May 12, 2006), 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=82473&lib=law. In particular, “absolute control” is generally 
understood to be majority ownership and “strong control” reflects an ownership share of thirty to fifty 
percent. See China's Indus. Policy and Its Impact on U.S. Cos., Workers and the Am. Econ.: Hearing 
Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 111th Cong. 78–79 (2009) (statement of 
Terrence P. Stewart).  
14 See  Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 738 (2013) (noting that only 51 of 
the core companies of the 117 national business groups in 2012 had boards of directors).  
15 See Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34 NW. J. 
INT'L L. & BUS. 395, 435 (2014) (describing how in recent cases involving Chinese SOEs, the 
Commission has considered the “worst-case scenario”). See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 
COMP/M.6151 (Petrochina/Ineos), slip op. ¶ 31; Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6113 
(DSM/Sinochem), slip op. ¶ 8 (May 19, 2011); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6141 (China 
National Agrochemical Corporation/Koor Industries/Makhteshim Agan Industries), slip op. ¶ 7 (Oct. 3, 
2011); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6235 (Honeywell/Sinochem), slip op. ¶ 29 (Dec. 2, 2011); 
Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6700 (Talisman/Sinopec)(Nov. 16, 2012); Commission Decision 
No. COMP/M.6715 (CNOOC/NEXEN)(Dec. 7, 2012). 
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approach, the Commission considers whether a given transaction could pose 
anticompetitive harm, while assuming that all Chinese SOEs in the same sector are 
treated as a single entity.16 Such an approach is akin to treating a large part of the 
Chinese economy as a firm—China, Inc. Until the end of 2015, the Commission 
unconditionally cleared all such transactions because even under the “worst-case 
scenario,” they would not pose any anticompetitive concern.17  This also made it 
possible for the Commission to leave open the issue of how it would determine the 
exact scope of China, Inc. However, in 2016, the Commission found it difficult to 
dodge this issue when asked to scrutinize the proposed joint venture between France’s 
EDF and China’s state-owned China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN) 
(EDF/CGN).18 Because CGN has little turnover in Europe, the Commission would not 
have been able to exert jurisdiction over this deal if CGN was viewed as an 
independent undertaking separate from other Chinese SOEs. Then the Commission, 
for the first time, concluded that all Chinese SOEs in the energy sectors would be 
treated as a single entity for the purpose of merger analysis.19 This determination 
allowed the Commission to scrutinize the deal, even though it ultimately cleared the 
transaction without imposing any remedies.  
 
The EDF/CGN decision has significant repercussions for future antitrust cases 
involving Chinese SOEs.20 From a procedural standpoint, the decision means that 
more deals involving Chinese SOEs will be notifiable to the Commission, which 
could cause delays. The EDF/CGN decision also makes it more likely for the deal to 
be held up by the Brussels authority. Instead of focusing on the target and the 
acquiring Chinese SOE alone, the competitive assessments would focus on the target 
and all the Chinese SOEs in the same sector, or even the whole public economy in 
China. Such assessment would significantly increase the potential horizontal and 
vertical overlaps between the parties, which could adversely affect transactions. It 
also has implications for remedies—a Chinese SOE may be deemed  unsuited to be a 
purchaser for the divested business of another SOE because they are deemed to 
belong to the same entity.21 Practitioners have warned that the problems could go 
beyond antitrust law.22  If other European regulators—such as those in charge of 
securities regulation—take a similar view, then a Chinese SOE may be required to 
provide financial disclosure of all the other SOEs operating in the same sector, as they 
are concert parties.23 A few Commission officials suggested that the issue of the 
                                                
16 Zhang, supra note 15.  
17 Id.  Nicholas French & Ninette Dodoo, EU Antitrust Regulator Widens Its Net to Review Chinese 
SOE Transactions, LEXOLOGY (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=176114c2-d471-4860-a14e-acbedb4183ea. 
18 Commission Decision No. M.7850 (EDF/CGN/NNB), slip op. ¶ 102 (Mar. 10, 2016). 
19 Id. ¶ 49 (“In view of the fact that Central SASAC can interfere with strategic investment decisions 
and can impose or facilitate coordination between SOEs at least with regard to SOEs active in the 
energy industry, the Commission concludes in the case at hand that CGN and other Chinese SOEs in 
that industry should not be deemed to have an independent power of decision from Central SASAC. 
The turnover of all companies controlled by Central SASAC that are active in the energy industry 
should therefore be aggregated.”). 
20 Michelle Price, Chinese State-Owned Companies Face Greater Scrutiny of EU Deals After Ruling, 
REUTERS (June 12, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-eu-m-a-idUSKCN0YZ00U. 
21 Geneviève Lallemand-Kirche, Caroline Tixier & Henri Piffaut, The Treatment of State-Owned 
Enterprises in EU Competition Law: New Developments and Future Challenges, 8 J. EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 295, 305 (2017). 
22 French & Dodoo, supra note 17.  
23 Id.  
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independence of Chinese SOEs could also have repercussions on state-aid law 
enforcement. 24  They noted that two Chinese SOEs considered to be part of the same 
group in a competition case may have trouble complying with the unbundling rules 
provided in the Third Energy Package in the European Union.25 At the same time, the 
Commission’s adoption of this seemingly cautious approach is also fraught with legal 
risks. As I have argued in a previous paper, treating a large number of Chinese SOEs 
as part of China, Inc. can jeopardize the Commission’s future jurisdiction over cases 
involving mergers or agreements between these SOEs.26 The European Union may 
have an interest in intervening in such cases if the market positions of the Chinese 
SOEs pose a threat to European consumers. As such, the Commission’s approach not 
only creates uncertainties for the business community, but also carries grave legal 
risks for the Commission itself.  
 
In this Article, I argue the Commission’s fundamental challenge in tackling Chinese 
SOE cases stems from the inherent difficulty of applying the concept of an 
undertaking to state ownership. Under the E.U. Merger Regulation (EUMR), the 
assessment of control is crucial for the delineation of the boundary of an undertaking, 
which in turn determines whether a transaction results in a change of control and is 
subject to review. However, a literal application of the concept of control could lead 
to an over-inclusive outcome. While in theory a State has the voting power to 
influence its SOEs, it may not necessarily have the incentive to coordinate their 
competition. Even if it does, the State may lack the ability to exert control over those 
SOEs’ commercial decisions. This is notably the case for China. After over three 
decades of market reform, most of the economic sectors in China have been 
liberalized.27 Competition was deliberately injected into those sectors to stimulate 
growth and to enhance productivities of the SOEs. 28 Moreover, even if the SOEs still 
command a significant share of national assets in the country, the power to manage 
and control the SOEs is fragmented due to China’s highly decentralized economy.29 
Rampant agency problems also make it difficult for SASAC to exert control over the 
SOEs, especially central SOEs that are corporate behemoths with tremendous political 
clout within the bureaucracy.30 As such, the Chinese State’s formal corporate rights 
over an SOE may have a weak correlation to the anticompetitive effects such 
ownership could cause.  
 
At the same time, the reliance on the EUMR to deal with SOE cases could lead to an 
under-inclusive outcome. Abundant literature has shown that minority shareholding in 
rivals can lead to anticompetitive effects.31 In fact, economists have shown that even a 
                                                
24 Lallemand-Kirche et al., supra note 21, at 306.  
25 Id.  
26 See Angela Huyue Zhang, The Single Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for Chinese State-
Owned Enterprises? 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 805, 825-26 (2012) (noting that if Chinese SOEs in 
the same sector are treated as part of a single entity, agreements, as well as mergers between them, 
would arguably be exempted from E.U. competition law).  
27 See Angela Huyue Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan: Is Antitrust Regulation a False Hope? 51 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 195, 201–02 (2015) (explaining how for the past few decades the main agenda of 
SOE reform has been to grant more autonomy to SOEs to motivate them to pursue growth and profit). 
28 Id. at 202. 
29 Id. at 207–08.  
30 See infra Part II(i)(2)(b).  
31 See infra Part II(ii)(1).  
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non-voting cross-ownership in concentrated industries could be anticompetitive.32  
However, acquisitions of a significant but non-controlling interest are currently 
exempt from the EUMR. 33  Therefore, minority acquisitions by SOEs may not 
withstand proper antitrust scrutiny by the Commission. Chinese SOEs pose particular 
challenges in this respect due to their deep pockets, their easy access to state 
financing, and their desire to acquire strategic assets in concentrated industries 
overseas. Moreover, regulators tend to overlook the fact that Chinese State ownership 
manifests itself in diverse forms, and that the line between SOEs and privately-owned 
enterprises (POEs) is increasingly blurred in China. Consequently, an SOE can escape 
the Commission’s scrutiny entirely if it employs a non-controlling subsidiary as a 
vehicle to acquire European assets.  
 
The fact that the EUMR can simultaneously lead to both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive outcomes is not self-contradictory. Such a divergent outcome derives from 
the inherent differences between the incentives and abilities of the Chinese State—a 
sovereignty with a highly complex utility function and a vast, intricate bureaucracy—
and those of an SOE—a commercial entity which has the strong desire to maximize 
financial returns in its overseas expansion. This does not deny the possibility that the 
Chinese State could have the incentive or the ability to coordinate its SOEs. Rather, 
the purpose of this Article is to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced analysis 
of the actual competitive landscape in China, refuting the simplistic view that the 
Chinese State will always coordinate its SOEs. Nor does this Article suggest that an 
SOE’s sole goal is to maximize profits—it is possible that an SOE has other political 
or social objectives. However, as few Chinese SOEs can afford to be indifferent to the 
financial returns on their investments, regulators should be alert to the risks to 
competition when a Chinese SOE holds cross-ownership in concentrated industries.   
 
Given the inadequacy of the EUMR in tackling SOE issues, the Commission should 
not tie its hands by fixating on defining the scope of the undertaking, as this may limit 
the EUMR’s review only to those cases in which the Chinese SOEs acquire a 
controlling interest. The fundamental question, after all, is not how to define and fit 
China, Inc. into legal framework under the EUMR; rather, the question is about 
identifying the anticompetitive effects of state ownership. Unfortunately, this is far 
from an easy task. Indeed, recognizing the clear incompatibility of its legal 
framework when applied to SOEs, the EUMR narrows its assessment of control from 
de jure to de facto control.34  Such an approach fundamentally shifts the paradigm of 
the merger review from a form of ex ante enforcement, which turns purely on the 
structural incentives, to one that emphasizes evidence of communication. However, it 
is extremely difficult to compile evidence of actual coordination by the Chinese 
State.35 In fact, communication between the State investor and the management is not 
necessary for any coordination to occur. Further, the anticompetitive effect does not 
require communication among firms when the Chinese SOE indirectly invests in a 
minority stake in a competing business. The interlocking ownership in itself leads to 
the structural incentives that could reduce competition.36  Furthermore, due to their 
                                                
32 Id. 
33 See infra Part II(ii).  
34 See infra Part II(ii)(1).  
35 See infra Part I(iii).  
36 Id. 
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superior political and economic status, Chinese SOEs could wield power and control 
that exceeds their formal corporate rights as a minority shareholder.  
 
Paradoxically, addressing both the over-inclusion and under-inclusion problems that 
Chinese SOEs have posed to the existing legal framework would require the 
Commission to simultaneously narrow and expand the concept of control, a mission 
impossible to achieve within the EUMR. To address this dilemma, I propose that the 
Commission ought to view national security review as a complement to its merger 
review. Both antitrust and national security law share an overlapping interest in 
preventing a foreign State from accumulating a significant market position in a 
strategic domestic product market, but national security review provides more 
flexibility and room for regulators to preemptively deal with such competition 
concerns. More fundamentally, the basis for the optimal regulatory response to  
acquisitions by SOEs hinges not only on economics, but also, perhaps more 
importantly, on politics. I thus caution against deploying competition policy too 
broadly when reviewing Chinese acquisitions. Indeed, the European Union’s concern 
about a regulatory vacuum seems overstated. To the extent that coordination by the 
Chinese State poses any competition concern in Europe, it would have been subject to 
national security review at the level of the E.U. member states. Therefore, adding a 
further layer of antitrust regulatory screening is unnecessary as it will unduly burden  
businesses. Moreover, it will carry grave risks for the Commission, as it could 
jeopardize the Commission’s jurisdiction over future cases involving Chinese SOEs.  
 
My analysis will proceed in three steps. Part I analyzes the rationale behind the  
EUMR provisions regarding the assessment of mergers between SOEs. After 
comparing the Commission’s precedents dealing with European and Chinese SOEs, 
Part I reveals that the Commission has applied a double standard in its current 
approach to Chinese SOEs. Part II examines how the EUMR has failed to address the 
fundamental problem of anticompetitive effects of state ownership, thus resulting in 
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive outcomes. Part III cautions against adopting a 
formalistic approach in dealing with state ownership and presents the solution of 
using national security review as a complement to antitrust review of acquisitions by 
Chinese SOEs.  
 
I.   The Dilemma of the EUMR  
Under the E.U. competition law, determining the boundary of an undertaking is 
crucial to whether competition law applies 37  Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) applies to agreements and concerted 
conduct between separate undertakings, 38  whereas the EUMR only applies to 
corporate reorganization between undertakings. 39  Moreover, under E.U. law, the 
boundary of an undertaking is relevant for the assessment of liabilities and fines. 
While this issue has been a perennial topic of fascination to policymakers and 
academics in Europe, scholars have tried in vain to identify a consistent and coherent 
                                                
37 See generally Alison Jones, The Boundaries of an Undertaking in EU Competition Law, 8 EUR. 
COMPETITION J. 301 (2012) (explaining how boundaries must be clearly defined to ensure that 
potentially anticompetitive arrangements between firms do not escape review under international 
competition laws). 
38 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, May 9, 2008, 
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
39 Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L24) art. 3 [hereinafter EUMR]. 
	   9 
approach.40  Intractable as it is to define an undertaking, the EUMR is built upon such 
a concept. Indeed, it is crucial to delineate the boundary of an undertaking to 
determine whether a transaction constitutes a concentration, whether it falls within the 
Commission’s jurisdiction, and how to conduct the competitive assessment. Article 
3(2) of the EUMR defines control as having the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence over an undertaking. 41  Since concentrations within the meaning of the 
EUMR are limited to changes in control,42 a merger between SOEs belonging to the 
same State should not be deemed to trigger a change in control, thus exempting  
consolidations between SOEs from E.U. regulation.  
 
To avoid discrimination between the public and private sector, Recital 22 of the 
EUMR creates an exception. Recital 22 provides that for mergers between SOEs 
belonging to the same State, account must be taken of “the undertakings making up an 
economic unit with an independent power of decision, irrespective of the way in 
which their capital is held or of the rules of administrative supervision applicable to 
them.”43 The Commission's Jurisdictional Notice expands further on this point:  
 
[W]here a State-owned company is not subject to any coordination with other 
State-controlled holdings, it should be treated as independent for the purposes 
of Article 5, and the turnover of other companies owned by that State should 
not be taken into account. Where, however, several State-owned companies 
are under the same independent center of commercial decision-making, then 
the turnover of those businesses should be considered part of the group of the 
undertaking concerned for the purposes of Article 5.44 
 
But how is it possible for an SOE to have independent decision-making when the 
State, as the controlling shareholder, could influence the firm’s corporate governance? 
In the following discussion, I analyze the logic of Recital 22, compare the governance 
structure of Chinese and French SOEs, and discuss the challenges the Commission 
faces in applying this provision to SOE cases.  
 
i.   The Logic of Recital 22  
As demonstrated by Oliver Hart’s Nobel winning scholarship, the defining feature of 
ownership is that the owner will retain residual control.45 Because transaction costs 
are never zero, contracting parties could never write a contract that anticipates all 
contingencies.46  As a consequence, not all rights conferred by ownership will be 
contracted away and an owner can always retain some residual control over their 
property. As Wouter Wils succinctly points out:  
 
[I]f the parent company has the possibility to exercise decisive 
influence over the strategic commercial behaviour of the subsidiary, 
the subsidiary cannot have real freedom to determine its course of 
                                                
40 See generally Jones, supra note 37.  
41 See id. art. 3(2). 
42 Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings 2008 O.J. (C 95), ¶ 51 [hereinafter Jurisdictional 
Notice]. 
43 See EUMR, supra note 39, ¶ 22. 
44 See Jurisdictional Notice, supra note 42, ¶ 194.  
45 OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29–55 (1995). 
46 Id. at 30.  
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action on the market. Even if the parent company happened not 
actually to exercise its influence, the subsidiary’s apparent freedom 
would only exist by the parent company’s grace, which could change 
at any time.47   
 
Applying this logic to SOEs, a State owner will always retain some residual control 
over its SOEs. Through residual rights of control, the State has the power to influence 
such firms, regardless of whether such influence has actually been exerted or is 
explicitly specified. Thus, strictly speaking, no SOEs can enjoy decision-making 
powers completely independent from the State.  
 
Moreover, the requirement that SOEs need to have sole autonomy in running their 
businesses independently of their owners interferes with the basic requirements for 
sound corporate governance. The fundamental issue in corporate governance is to 
address the agency problem, an inherent concern in any modern corporation where  
ownership and control are separate.48  To safeguard the State’s interests in the SOEs, 
it is essential for the State investor to actively exercise its voting rights as a 
shareholder to engage in corporate governance. If a large investor completely cedes 
control over the firm to the management, the management will be subject to little 
monitoring from the shareholders. For this reason, Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon 
have advocated using law to encourage activist investing in the United States, as 
activist investors are more motivated than large institutional shareholders to achieve 
vigorous corporate governance.49 In a similar vein, it should be efficient for a State 
shareholder to actively participate in the governance of the firms it owns.  
 
The above analysis shows that the State, by simply voting its stock, can always 
influence its SOEs. Accordingly, if the State is solely profit-driven like a firm, then it 
will have the incentive to coordinate its SOEs to maximize the joint profit. In that 
case, it is not even necessary to engage with the de facto question of whether such 
coordination has indeed occurred.  Thus, to make sense, Recital 22 must assume that a 
State has a utility function different from an ordinary commercial entity, and the key 
issue here lies in examining de facto control rather than de jure control. That is, while 
the State in theory can influence its SOEs, if the SOEs in fact operate independently 
from each other, then a merger between them will deprive the market of two real 
competitors. This provides the basis for the Commission to intervene. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the Commission’s own Jurisdictional Notice, which 
focuses on whether the State in fact attempts to coordinate competition among its 
SOEs. 50 
 
Such a legal framework, however, results in a paradigm shift in the way that merger 
review is conducted. As a form of ex-ante enforcement, merger review focuses on 
whether the integration of two otherwise independent competitors will result in a 
substantial lessening of competition. The loss of competition depends on how the 
                                                
47 See Wouter P.J. Wils, The Undertaking as Subject of E.C. Competition Law and the Imputation of 
Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons, 25 EUR. L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2000). 
48 Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 
304 (1983). 
49 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors 
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 896-7 (2013).  
50 Jurisdictional Notice, supra note 42, ¶ 194. 
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incentives of the firms to compete have been reduced because of the change in the 
structure of the market.  Consistent with this logic, Article 3(2) of the EUMR defines 
control as “the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking,” and “it 
is therefore not necessary to show that the decisive influence is or will be actually 
exercised.”51 Such a legal design makes sense from a practical standpoint. As Wouter 
Wils has pointed out, de facto control is extremely difficult and costly to identify.52 
Indeed, explicit communication is not necessary for the State to exert control over the 
SOEs. Even if the State does not participate in the firm’s activities directly, the State 
has the opportunity to appoint executives to the board, who will then participate in the 
company’s important commercial decisions, such as its budget, business plans, and 
commercial strategies. To display loyalty to the State, management may have an 
incentive to act according to the State’s wishes. Therefore, despite engaging in a 
passive investment strategy, the State investor would have the opportunity to 
indirectly influence the actions of the SOEs by simply exercising its basic voting 
rights. This is the same for all SOEs, whether they are Chinese or non-Chinese.  
 
Further, the State can design incentive packages for executives at SOEs in a way that 
discourages competition with their state-owned rivals. This is especially the case 
when the structure of executive compensation links the firm’s profitability to the 
industry or competitor’s profitability. 53  Recent empirical research on common 
shareholding by institutional shareholders shows that commonly-owned firms are 
more likely to compensate CEOs based on industry performance rather than on 
performance relative to competitors. 54  CEOs are therefore incentivized to soften 
competition with rivals to maximize their own compensation. In fact, even if the State 
has absolutely no voting power, there are other means not available to ordinary 
commercial investors through which the State can exert influence over firms. For 
instance, managers could have incentives to obey the State if the State can somehow 
influence their future employment upon departure, especially if the managers 
ultimately desire political careers. 55  Similarly, the State can influence a firm’s 
commercial decisions if it can entice the firm with cheaper financing than what is 
available on the market or if it promises to bail out a firm when it is in trouble. The 
corporate governance of Chinese and French SOEs illustrates the challenges that the 
Commission faces in applying Recital 22 to SOEs.  
 
ii.   Comparing the Chinese and French SOEs 
In China, most industrial firms are currently supervised by SASAC, a special 
commission directly subordinate to the State Council. In the pre-reform era, all 
industrial Chinese SOEs were owned and managed by various central ministries. 
After several rounds of market reform, the control rights were transferred from the 
ministries to SASAC, an independent agency created in 2003. Thus, the establishment 
of SASAC—a move intended to separate the government’s public role from its role as 
an investor—is an important step in China’s market reform.56 Local governments—
                                                
51 Id. ¶ 16. 
52 Wils, supra note 47, at 107.  
53 David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2000); see 
also Elhauge, supra note 2, at 1278–81. 
54 Miguel Antón et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives 3-5 (Ross 
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328, 2017).  
55 See infra Part I(ii).  
56 See SASAC, China State-Owned Asset Management System Reform Entering New Stage (May 23, 
2003), article on file with editor.   
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including provincial and municipal governments—were also directed to establish their 
own local SASACs, which represent the local government’s ownership of assets and 
are not subordinate to the central SASAC.57 According to an estimate in 2011, there 
were approximately 300 SASACs in China, including the central SASAC, 
approximately 30 provincial SASACs, and scores of municipal SASACs.58 At its 
inception, SASAC oversaw 196 SOEs at the central level.59  However, by the end of 
2016, that number decreased to 102, as SASAC encouraged the consolidation of 
SOEs or the sale of non-strategic SOEs to local governments.60 
 
Notably, SASAC’s role in the management of state assets was only formally 
recognized upon the promulgation of the Enterprise State-Owned Assets Law (the 
“State Assets Law”) in 2008.61 This law explicitly designates SASAC as a fiduciary 
for the State’s ownership interest. Under the State Assets Law, SASAC is entitled to 
rights as a shareholder, including returns on its investments and approval of any major 
ownership decisions such as mergers, bankruptcy, and the issuance of new securities 
of the firm.62 In addition, SASAC has the authority to appoint directors, managers, 
and supervisors of wholly state-owned enterprises and may nominate directors and 
supervisors in partially state-owned enterprises.63 Other than in the exercise of such 
rights, SASAC is not allowed to intervene directly in management or day-to-day 
operations.64 The central SASAC also promulgates rules for SOEs and oversees the 
activities of local SASACs to ensure compliance with government mandates.65   
 
While on the surface the establishment of SASAC has weakened the administrative 
ties between the government and the SOEs, their link has not been completely 
severed. Richard McGregor, a former bureau chief of the Financial Times, detailed as 
much in The Party, an influential book published in 2010 that attempts to unravel the 
mystery behind the CCP’s control over various aspects of the Chinese political 
economy.66 In The Party, McGregor coined and popularized the term “China, Inc.," 
telling vivid stories of how the CCP was able to maintain a tight grip on the Chinese 
state-owned behemoths in the oil, mineral, and banking sectors.67 The success of The 
Party has generated further suspicion of the independence of the Chinese SOEs under 
SASAC’s supervision. Indeed, one of the most important controls that the CCP can 
                                                
57 Barry Naughton, The State Asset Commission: A Powerful New Government Body, 8 CHINA 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 3 (2003).  
58 Yongsheng Deng et al., Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China's Housing 
Market 48 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16871, 2011).  
59 See SASAC, supra note 56. 
60 The List of Central SOEs, SASAC (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86114/n86137/index.html. 
61 Zhōng huá rén mín gòng hé guó qǐ yè guó yǒu zī chǎn fǎ (中华人民共和国企业国有资产法) [Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2008, effective May 1, 2009), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=109891. 
62 Id. arts. 12, 16, 18, 21, 30–38. 
63 Id. art. 22. 
64 See id. arts. 6, 14. 
65 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM: 
CHINA—DEFINING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE 59 (2009).  
66 RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS (2010). 
67 Id. at 34-49.  
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exert over the SOEs is through personnel appointment.68 Although SASAC in theory 
has the right to appoint and select managers, in practice it exercised such rights in the 
shadow of party control. The top leaders of the fifty-three central companies, who 
have the equivalent bureaucratic ranking of vice-ministers, are directly appointed by 
the Department of Organization, the human resource department of the CCP. 69 
Moreover, the executive positions in Chinese SOEs are not solely awarded based on 
financial performance. For the top executives at the leading central SOEs, their career 
paths upon leaving the firms are determined by the CCP.70 Furthermore, because 
SASAC only has a limited capacity and lacks management expertise in a diverse 
range of industries, in practice it relies heavily on industry regulators for 
recommendations for the appointment of senior executives and the exercise of 
shareholders’ right in the SOEs.71  
 
Yet, China is not unique in applying a centralized model to manage state assets.72  
Such a model has also been adopted in a number of European countries, including 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, France, and Poland, 
often as a result of the implementation of privatization reforms. 73  Among these 
countries, France is the most similar to China because it has established a specialized 
independent agency, the Government Shareholding Agency (APE), to manage state 
assets.74 Established in 2004, the APE is the French counterpart of SASAC. Acting 
under the joint authority of the Minister of Finance, the Public Budget, and the 
Minister for the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs, the APE’s statutory mission 
is to preserve the patrimonial interests of the French government and to fulfill the 
mission of the State-shareholder in French SOEs.75 As of the end of 2014, it manages 
74 SOEs on behalf of the French government and oversees assets of over 110 billion 
euros. 76  French State ownership is most common in the energy sector (72%), 
                                                
68 See Zhang, supra note 26, at 814–15 (explaining how the CCP’s control over personnel allowed 
them to overhaul companies while still maintaining leverage); see generally Jiangyu Wang, The 
Political Logic of Corporate Governance in China’s State-Owned Enterprises, 47 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 
631 (2014) (discussing how controlling personnel allows the CCP to also control the decision-making 
processes). 
69 Wang, supra note 68, at 659; see also Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 14, at 737–38 (noting that this 
practice of appointing top leaders of the fifty-three central SOEs is a legacy of the appointment practice 
prior to the establishment of SASAC). 
70 See Nan Lin, Capitalism in China: A Centrally Managed Capitalism (CMC) and Its Future, 7 
MGMT. & ORG. REV. 63,74 (2010); see also Wang, supra note 68, at 660 (noting that as of 2010, 43 of 
the 263 governors and vice governors for China’s provinces and provincial-level municipalities had 
business backgrounds and 23 of China’s 31 provinces had governors or vice governors who had 
worked as SOE executives). 
71 Deng Feng, Indigenous Evolution of SOE Regulation, in REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND? THE 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 14, 14–16 (Benjamin L. Liebman & 
Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2016).  
72 See generally Maria Vagliasindi, Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises (World 
Bank Sustainable Dev. Network, Working Paper No. 4542, 2008) (listing several countries that use a 
centralized model, including but not limited to: Denmark, Spain, Sweden, and Belgium).  
73 Id. at 11–14. 
74 E.g. AGENCE DES PARTICIPATIONS DE L’ÉTAT, THE GOVERNMENT AS SHAREHOLDER: 2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT, http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/agence-participations-etat/ANG-
Panorama.pdf [2014 Annual Report]. 
75 Décret 2004-963 du 9 septembre 2004 portant création du service à compétence nationale Agence 
des participations de l’Etat [Decree 2004-963 of September 9, 2004 establishing the national service 
State Shareholding Agency], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 10, 2004, p. 341. 
76 2014 Annual Report, supra note 74, at 8. 
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followed by the defense (13.3%), transport (9.5%), and telecom sectors (4.9%).77 
Legislation on the APE’s representatives allows the APE to appoint representatives to 
the company’s board of directors, supervisory board, or other deliberative bodies if it 
directly or indirectly owns more than fifty percent of the capital in the firm. 78  
Legislation also allows the APE to appoint representatives to the company’s 
deliberative bodies if it owns more than ten percent of the capital in the firm.79 
According to the APE’s 2014 annual report, the French government appointed 761 
directors on the boards of directors or the supervisory boards of these SOEs that 
year.80  The report also shows that the agency attended 287 board of directors or 
supervisory board meetings and 274 specialized committee meetings since June 
2014. 81  In addition, legislation on the APE’s representatives allows the 
representatives of the French State to exercise the same rights and powers as those 
provided by other members of the board of directors, the supervisory boards, or the 
governing body in place. 82  
 
At least on paper, the French style of state holding is similar to the Chinese model. 
Consider EDF, the counterparty to the Chinese SOE in the EDF/GCN case and also 
one of the largest SOEs owned by the French State. The French government owns 
84.5% of EDF, according to the latest annual report by APE.83 In fact, EDF’s statute 
restricts non-state ownership to thirty percent.84 At the end of 2014, the composition 
of the board on EDF consisted of eleven directors appointed at the general meeting of 
shareholders—five were recommended by the French State, one APE representative, 
and six directors elected by employees.85 The chairman and the CEO of EDF are 
appointed by the decree of the French President upon the recommendation of the 
board of directors. 86  Any major commercial decisions, such as mergers and 
acquisitions, investments, and executive compensation, require the approval of the 
French State.87 Therefore, even if the French government adopts a passive investment 
strategy, it can indirectly influence the strategy of EDF through the appointment of 
executives to EDF. For instance, Gérard Magnin, who recently resigned from the 
board of EDF in opposition to its EDF/GCN project, was appointed by the French 
government in 2014. 88  Given Magnin’s background in alternative energy, his 
                                                
77 These statistics are current through April 2014. Id. at 33.  
78 Ordonnance 2014-948 du 20 août 2014 relative à la gouvernance et aux opérations sur le capital des 
sociétés à participation publique [Ordinance 2014-948 of August 20, 2014 on the governance and 
capital transactions of publically-controlled companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 23, 2014, p. 14011. 
79 Id.  
80 2014 Annual Report, supra note 74, at 9. 
81 Id. at 9. 
82 Ordonnance 2014-948, supra note 78,  at 14011.  
83 2014 Annual Report, supra note 74, at 19. 
84 Loi 2004-803 du 9 août 2004 relative au service public de l'électricité et du gaz et aux entreprises 
électriques et gazières [Law 2004-803 of August 9, 2004 relating to the public service of electricity and 
gas and to electric and gas companies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 11, 2004, p. 14256 (noting in Article 24 that the State retains 
seventy percent of the capital of the company). 
85 EDF, 2014 Facts and Figures, EDF.FR 21–22, 
https://www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/documents/faits_et_chiffres/2015/F%26F_EDF_2014_VA.pdf.  
86 Id. at 27.  
87 Id. 
88 Graham Ruddick, Resignation of EDF Director Paves Way for Hinkley Point Go-Ahead, GUARDIAN 
(July 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/28/resignation-edf-director-hinkley-
point-gerard-magnin. 
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appointment at that time was widely speculated to be a strategic move by the French 
government to encourage the firm to invest more in renewable energy.89 In 2014, the 
French parliament introduced a new decree granting long-term shareholders automatic 
double voting powers, unless a firm’s articles of association forbid them.90 Some 
commentators suggested that the aim of the new law was to allow the State the 
flexibility to divest its holding in SOEs while retaining or even strengthening its 
control over SOEs in strategic industries.91  The new law also allows the French 
government to fend off unwanted takeovers of French companies.92 For instance, the 
French government now has double voting rights in EDF, thus allowing the 
government to exert a much greater influence on the firm’s commercial activities 
beyond its existing shareholding.93   
 
Similar to Chinese SOEs, political appointments of representatives at large French 
SOEs is not uncommon. As an OECD report points out, “In a number of cases there is 
a direct political dimension to the nomination with the direct involvement of the 
Council of Ministries or even the President, such as in France for Chairmen and CEOs 
of some large SOEs.”94 A recent example is the French socialists government’s move 
to oust Henri Proglio in 2014 as chief executive of EDF France, as he was particularly 
close to the former center right president Nicolas Sarkozy.95  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the French government had also interfered in the daily operation of 
SOEs. For instance, the French government has reportedly pressured its SOEs to buy 
products of Alstom to prop up the ailing SOE.96 On another occasion, the French 
government’s concern about job loss prompted the government to spend 600 million 
euros on a high-speed train in order to save a failing Alstom engineering plant.97 
 
A comparison of the respective corporate governance structures of the Chinese and 
French SOEs is revealing. First, as fiduciaries of the State, both SASAC and APE 
assume the management role of safeguarding state assets. As such, they need to be 
involved in the SOEs’ commercial decision-making, either directly or indirectly. It is 
unrealistic to expect the State to completely tie its hands so that the SOEs will have 
sole autonomy to run the company, as the EUMR suggests. Such a demand is not 
efficient from a corporate governance standpoint either. Second, both SASAC and 
                                                
89 Id. 
90 Tony Barber, Illusionary French Sell-Off Plan Lacks Authenticity of Old, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/56eacd34-748f-11e4-8321-00144feabdc0; see Loi 2014-384 du 29 
mars 2014 visant à reconquérir l'économie réelle [Law 2014-384 of March 29, 2014 to reclaim the real 
economy (“Loi Florange”)], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], Apr. 1, 2014, p. 6232 
91 Curtis Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, Governance Challenges of Listed State-Owned Enterprises 
Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform 11 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 352/2017, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2942193. 
92 Barber, supra note 90.  
93 EDF, supra note 85, at 26.   
94 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF OECD COUNTRIES 91 (2005).  
95 Michael Stothard & Hugh Carney, French Government Ousts Proglio at EDF, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 
2014), https://www.ft.com/content/fa74939a-545a-11e4-b2ea-00144feab7de. 
96 Simon C.Y. Wong, Improving Corporate Governance in SOEs: An Integrated Approach, 7 CORP. 
GOVERNANCE INT’L 9, 13 (2004). 
97 Ann-Sylvaine Chassany, France to Buy Unneeded Train to Save Belfort Factory, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9e7deeee-8a07-11e6-8aa5-f79f5696c731. 
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APE can influence the commercial strategies of the SOEs indirectly through the 
appointment of executives, even if they are not directly involved in any decision-
making and have delegated much discretion to the management. Neither agency needs 
to rely on explicit mechanism to control its management, nor is communication 
necessary. Therefore, as long as the government retains the power to control the 
personnel within the SOEs, the ties between the government and the business cannot 
be completely severed. Third, even if French SOEs have established a better corporate 
governance structure, injected more transparency in its operation, and provided more 
public disclosure about its management than their Chinese counterparts, they are not 
completely immune from political interference. Thus, the question confronting the 
Commission is not a qualitative one about whether the SOEs have the independent 
power of decision-making as laid down in Recital 22. None of them do. The real 
question is quantitative—to what degree does the SOE’s power of decision-making 
allow it to compete in the market independent from other SOEs?   
 
iii.   Applying a Double Standard  
The Commission has applied Recital 22 to examine merger transactions involving 
both European and Chinese SOEs. Officials from the Commission have stated that the 
Commission has applied the same criteria to assess both cases involving Chinese 
SOEs and European SOEs.98 In reality, the Commission’s approach has not been 
anything but consistent. While the Commission focuses on actual control when 
scrutinizing cases involving European SOEs, it has implemented a more onerous test 
when reviewing cases involving Chinese SOEs.  
 
In Neste/IVO, a merger transaction between two Finnish SOEs in 1998, the 
Commission found that the Finnish government could exercise its shareholding rights 
and vote on important commercial issues such as mergers and acquisitions and 
listing.99 However, the Commission found no indications that the commercial conduct 
of Neste and IVO had been coordinated in the past; rather, the Commission 
determined that the two SOEs’ operative matters were run independently by their 
respective operating management.100 The Commission therefore concluded that these 
two Finnish SOEs acted independently on the market.101   
 
In EDF/Segebel, an acquisition by EDF of a Belgian electricity company in 2009, the 
Commission had to decide whether GDF Suez, which is also a portfolio company of 
APE, should be deemed independent from EDF.102 The Commission acknowledged 
that the APE is responsible for managing the French State’s shareholding in both 
SOEs; however, the Commission noted that the role of the APE was “clearly limited” 
and does not appear to affect “the commercial and business autonomy of these 
companies.”103 The Commission also pointed to three pieces of evidence suggesting 
that these two French SOEs are in fact independent: first, EDF can independently set 
                                                
98 Joaquin Almunia, Speech at the Eighteenth St. Gallen International Competition Law Forum ICF: 
Recent Developments and Future Priorities in E.U. Competition Policy (Apr. 8, 2011); Cecilio Madero 
Villarejo, Deputy Director General for Antitrust Directorate General for Competition European 
Commission, Speech at the Seventh International Conference on Competition Law and Policy in 
Beijing: Recent Trends in EU Merger Control (June 1, 2011). 
99 Commission Decision No. IV/M.931 (Neste/IVO), slip op. ¶ 8 (Sept. 17, 2002). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5549 (EDF/Segebel), slip op. (Nov. 12, 2009). 
103 Id. ¶ 98.  
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its business plan in relation to GDF Suez and in accordance with its own commercial 
interest;104 second, there is no interlocking directorship between these two SOEs; 105 
and third, there are adequate safeguards to ensure that commercially sensitive 
information is not shared between these two entities.106 Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the Commission concluded that EDF and GDF Suez were separate 
undertakings.107   
 
In both the Neste/IVO case and the EDF/Segebel case, the Commission explicitly 
recognized that the respective States involved had voting power in the SOEs, which 
would presumably give the States the power to intervene in many important 
commercial decisions, including the appointment of executives to the boards of these 
entities. However, the Commission seemed undisturbed by de jure control, noting that 
the power and the role of the State in these situations was limited. Rather, the 
Commission focused on de facto control, that is, whether the underlying SOEs in fact 
coordinated competition between themselves. This focus on de facto control contrasts 
with the Commission’s approach to reviewing foreign-controlled SOEs. For instance, 
during its recent review of a transaction involving Rosneft, a Russian SOE, the 
Commission highlighted the fact that the Russian Federation’s power to control the 
appointment and removal of members of the board of directors is an important factor 
indicating that it can influence the commercial and strategic decisions of Rosneft.108 
But such power is a norm among all SOEs. If it did not cause any concern for the 
Commission in Neste/IVO and EDF/Segabel, why did it become a problem in 
Rosneft’s proposed merger with TNK-BP? The answer may lie in the fact that the 
Commission was suspicious of the Russian government’s influence over the 
commercial decisions of Rosneft and other SOEs. However, because it is difficult for 
the Commission to obtain direct evidence of such coordination, it fell back on the 
evidence of de jure control. This is tautological, but it seems to be exactly what 
happened in the cases involving Chinese SOEs as well.  
 
The first case in which the Commission raised suspicions about the independence of 
Chinese SOEs is China National Bluestar/Elkem (“Bluestar/Elkem”), a proposed 
acquisition of the Norwegian silicon producer Elkem by China National Bluestar in 
2011. 109  China National Bluestar is a subsidiary of ChemChina，which reports 
directly to the central SASAC. The parties in Bluestar/Elkem argued that ChemChina 
had decision-making power independent of central SASAC, which essentially 
exercises the basic ownership functions on behalf of the Chinese State as a non-
managing trustee.110 The parties also argued that local SASACs are independent from 
central SASAC.111 They noted that the central SASAC has no authority to appoint 
management for SOEs that operate under regional SASACs; rather, this authority 
resides exclusively with local governments and local political organs.112 In addition, 
the parties in Bluestar/Elkem submitted that SASAC’s key functions are limited to 
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actions such as nominating the top management, reviewing the annual results of the 
SOEs and ensuring that the SOEs are operating within the permitted license. 113  
Additionally, the parties argued that the level of state intervention in the industry 
sectors relevant to the transaction is very minor114 and that SASAC does not interfere 
with the strategic decision-making of the SOEs, such as approval of business plans or 
budget.115 The parties proffered three pieces of evidence to show the lack of state 
intervention in the SOEs: (1) SASAC had never requested commercial information 
from the SOEs or in any other way influenced the commercial operations of the 
SOEs,116 (2) the dividend policy of the SOEs is not established by SASAC on a case-
by-case basis but rather is set consistently across all central SOEs, and (3) 
management is compensated based on a point-system that takes into account various 
factors.117 The parties in Bluestar/Elkem also noted that SASAC has limited capacity 
to oversee the SOEs. At that time, the central SASAC oversaw 125 large central 
SOEs and employed only 800 people.118  
 
The findings the Commission gathered during its own market investigation seem to 
support the parties’ position. First, the concerned underlying market is highly 
fragmented with more than 200 firms, many of which are privately owned. 119  Second, 
almost all the state-owned firms in the market belong to the local governments and 
ChemChina is the only SOE that reports to the central SASAC.120 Third, customers in 
Europe did not believe that there was coordination among the producers.121 These 
findings suggest that local SOEs, together with private domestic firms, appear to 
exercise effective competitive constraint on ChemChina. Thus, had the Commission 
applied the same de facto standard as it had in Neste/IVO and EDF/Segebel, it should 
have endorsed the parties’ position. The Commission, however, was reluctant to do so. 
When summarizing previous precedents dealing with European SOEs, the 
Commission noted that the overall assessment was “guided by the possible power of 
the State to influence the companies’ commercial strategy and the likelihood for the 
State to actually coordinate their commercial conduct, either by imposing or 
facilitating such coordination.”122 The emphasis on the “probabilistic” nature of the 
State’s power to influence these SOEs deviates from the Commission’s decisional 
practice in previous European cases. Indeed, unconvinced by the parties’ arguments, 
the Commission carried out a detailed assessment examining the product overlaps 
between Elkem’s activities and the activities of ChemChina and other SOEs under the 
supervision of central SASAC as well as the local SASACs.123   
 
Similar issues arose during the Commission’s assessment of a joint venture between 
Koninklijke DSM N.V (DSM), a Dutch company, and Sinochem, another SOE under 
the supervision of central SASAC. Again the Commission was not convinced that 
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Sinochem was truly independent from SASAC.124 The Commission pointed to the 
core legislation of the State Assets Law and the associated information on SASAC’s 
website as evidence suggesting that the SOEs do not have independent power of 
decision-making.125 The specific language was quoted by the Commission as follows:  
 
SASAC guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of state-
owned enterprises, advances the establishment of modern enterprise system in 
SOEs, improves corporate governance, and propels the strategic adjustment of 
the layout and structure of the state economy [and] 
 
SASAC is responsible for the fundamental management of the state-owned 
assets of enterprises, works out draft laws and regulations on the management 
of the state-owned assets, establishes related rules and regulations and directs 
and supervises the management work of local state-owned assets according to 
law.126 
 
It is not entirely clear why the above language raised the Commission’s suspicion, as 
it appears to simply outline the normal functions of a state asset management firm. In 
addition, the Commission cited an OECD report and a book by Barry Naughton 
suggesting that commercial decisions of Chinese SOEs could be influenced by the 
Chinese State through both formal channels such as SASAC and in less formal 
ways. 127  The Commission noted that SASAC’s own official statements provided 
certain indications in this regard. It further quoted a sentence from Sinochem’s 
Annual Report as indicating that there was cooperation between Sinochem and the 
Chinese Government: “As the key state-owned enterprise, Sinochem Group is 
dedicated to serving the greater good of the national political stability, economic 
development, and social progress.”128 
 
The aforementioned evidence gathered by the Commission in the case involving 
Sinochem suggests that SASAC has the power to influence the decision-making of 
the SOEs it supervises.  However, it provides no indication that SASAC had actually 
done so in an effort to limit competition between Sinochem and other SOEs in the 
same industry sector. The results from the market investigation are mixed. On the one 
hand, the Commission found that the possibilities for these SOEs to act independently 
might be more limited than with private enterprises.129 Some respondents expressed 
concern that the proposed joint venture and other Chinese SOEs could have incentives 
to coordinate in the markets and that such coordination is likely.130 Respondents also 
noted that the transaction was part of Chinese SOEs’ attempt to gain more leverage in 
the markets concerned. 131  At the same time, Europe-based customers and one 
respondent in China indicated that Chinese suppliers do compete with one another to 
a certain degree.132    
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The Commission revisited the same issue about the independence of the SOEs in 
subsequent cases but ultimately left open the question of how to determine the scope 
of the SOEs in its official decisions.133 But the Commission was no longer able to 
dodge the issue in EDF/CGN. Because CGN has little turnover in Europe, the only 
way for the Commission to exert jurisdiction over the EDF/CGN transaction was to 
enlarge the scope of the SOEs involved in this case. To do this, the Commission 
pointed to the State Assets Law and its interim measures allowing SASAC to vote on 
important business decisions, such as strategies, business plans, or budgets.134 The 
Commission used these provisions as evidence that SASAC can influence the 
commercial decisions of the SOEs under its supervision. This is puzzling, as SASAC, 
like all state investors, would need to exercise its basic voting rights to govern the 
SOEs it supervises. 
 
Perhaps what most concerned the Commission was that the EDF/CGN case involved 
the nuclear industry, a highly sensitive and important industry sector. Again, the 
Commission relied on the specific wording in the State Assets Law, noting that the 
Chinese government will promote the centralization of state-owned capital in 
important industries that have bearings on the national economic lifeline and national 
security.135 It is possible that because nuclear power is such an important industry, the 
Commission believed that the Chinese government had a strategic interest in 
coordinating competition of firms in this industry. While the Commission did not 
identify explicit evidence of coordination, it nonetheless  found some evidence of the 
establishment of a strategic alliance among Chinese nuclear companies.136 As quoted 
by the Commission, the creation of the China Nuclear Industry Alliance was “directed 
by the [Chinese] government to achieve some synergy” and is “designed to eliminate 
detrimental or unseemly competition in export market.”137 This seems to indicate that 
Chinese nuclear power companies may be engaging in export cartels, but there is not 
sufficient evidence to conclude that they are acting like a single firm. Moreover, it 
would not make sense for the Commission to do so—if these Chinese nuclear 
companies do in fact engage in export cartels, such conduct is clearly prohibited 
under Article 101 of the TFEU.138 However, because the Commission has decided 
that all Chinese SOEs operating in the energy sector are to be treated as one entity, 
this may allow Chinese nuclear companies to defend themselves on the basis of single 
firm conduct.  
 
Finally, the Commission pointed to the fact that CGN had signed an agreement to 
create a joint venture with CNNC, another SOE in the nuclear sector, for the 
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development and marketing of a nuclear technology globally.139 Such a strategic link 
could be subject to antitrust scrutiny,140 but again, it is far from clear that they are 
acting like a single firm. Based on the above facts, the Commission decided that 
Central SASAC has the power to interfere with the strategic investment decisions and 
can facilitate coordination between Chinese SOEs, at least with regard to those in the 
energy sector.141 The Commission therefore concluded that CGN and other Chinese 
SOEs in the energy sector should be deemed a single entity, and that their turnover 
should be aggregated for the purpose of merger notification. 142  Ultimately, the 
transaction was cleared because even if all Chinese SOEs in the energy sector are 
viewed as a single entity, the deal would not pose any competitive concern.143 The 
Commission left open the question of how to treat other SOEs, including those that 
are not operating in the energy sector and those that are owned by local 
governments.144 
 
The EDF/CGN case caused a stir in the European antitrust community.145 Law firm 
partners scurried to send alert memos to their clients advising of the potential 
implications of such decisions. Several European scholars and commentators 
expressly endorsed the Commission’s decision and called on the Commission to take 
a bolder and more stringent approach in scrutinizing future Chinese investment.146 In 
particular, Alan Riley, a senior fellow for the Institute for Statecraft based in London, 
suggested that the Commission should treat all SOEs, not just those in the same 
sector, as one entity for the purpose of merger assessment.147 This approach is akin to 
asking the Commission to treat all Chinese SOEs as constituting a China, Inc. Nicolas 
Petit, a professor at the University of Liège in Belgium, went even further, suggesting 
that all Chinese firms with a CCP link should be treated as a single entity, regardless 
of their ownership status.148 The gist of Petit’s argument is that Chinese firms operate 
as a Party-led syndicate that is analogous to those super-trusts that fueled social 
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demand for antitrust regulation in the twentieth century.149 Since all Chinese SOEs 
and many large private domestic Chinese companies have established party 
organizations, Petit’s proposal would require treating the majority of firms operating 
in China as a single firm.  
 
Given the pervasive political control that the CCP exerted over SOEs and the opacity 
of the corporate governance within these firms, it is understandable that policymakers 
and academics are skeptical about the independence of Chinese SOEs. The problem, 
however, is that they have misinterpreted and misapplied Recital 22. Instead of 
focusing on the actual influence exerted by a State on an SOE, they have focused on 
the possibility of the Chinese State to influence the SOEs—particularly the structural 
links between SASAC and the SOEs concerned. Indeed, Recital 22 places the 
Commission in a difficult position. While the regulator is correctly concerned that 
SASAC—and the CCP by extension—may be working behind the scenes to influence 
the competitive strategies of those SOEs within their control, the evidence of 
coordination is extremely hard to ascertain. Consequently, the Commission fell back 
on the evidence of de jure control and used it to infer de facto control. This is clearly 
inconsistent with the standard that the Commission applied to European SOEs, 
jeopardizing its hard-earned image as an impartial and nondiscriminatory regulator. 
As discussed in Part II below, the challenges that the Commission faced in applying 
Recital 22 to SOEs are deeply rooted in the legal framework upon which the EUMR 
is built.  
 
II.   When the EUMR Fails in Applying to Chinese SOEs 
The EUMR applies to concentrations that have a community dimension.150 As such, 
the delineation of the boundary of an undertaking is a prerequisite for the Commission 
to exert jurisdiction and to conduct the competitive assessment. Such a legal design, 
however, is premised on two assumptions: first, the ultimate controlling entity of the 
undertaking must have an incentive to coordinate the competition among those firms 
within its control; and second, it must have the ability to do so. While this would 
normally make sense for commercial entities, those assumptions could not be taken 
for granted when it comes to SOEs, especially for Chinese SOEs. This results in an 
over-inclusive outcome where two independent Chinese SOEs who are actually 
competing with each other are treated as part of China, Inc. At the same time, 
applying the concept of an undertaking to Chinese SOEs can lead to an under-
inclusive outcome. Currently, the EUMR only covers acquisitions of control; it does 
not apply to acquisitions of a minority interest that does not confer control. However, 
ownership and control are not absolute, as anticompetitive effects could arise even 
when the State only acquires a non-controlling minority interest in a rival firm. Such 
cases, however, fall outside the ambit of the EUMR.  
 
i.   The Problem of Overinclusion 
As Holmstrom and Tirole have long demonstrated, competition is an effective 
safeguard on the performance of firms.151 Chinese leadership has long embraced this 
logic, allowing the entry of private capital into most economic sectors. As non-state 
firms intensively compete with SOEs in liberalized sectors, the government has little 
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incentive to coordinate competition among SOEs in those sectors. Thus, even if the 
CCP maintains political control over SOEs, such control does not necessarily translate 
into control over competitive strategies. On the other hand, the Chinese State, despite 
its power and influence, is not omnipotent. While political power is highly centralized 
in the hands of the CCP, the economic rights of governance are in fact highly 
decentralized. Consequently, there is a lack of unity of interest among SOEs owned 
by the local governments, which account for the majority of the SOEs in China.152 
Moreover, the existence of rampant agency problems in SOEs at all levels poses a 
significant challenge for the government when it comes to controlling these SOEs. 
Therefore, even when the government has an interest to coordinate competition, it 
often fails to achieve such.  
 
(1)   The Utility Function of the Chinese State 
Barry Naughton, a well-known expert on the Chinese economy, has tried to resolve 
the puzzle of how China could sustain high economic growth in the absence of  
adequate protection of individual property rights.153 The answer, he argues, lies in the 
establishment of a competitive mechanism which imposes disciplines on SOEs.154  
According to Naughton, the competition from private domestic firms and foreign-
invested firms have exerted pressures on the state-owned incumbents and forced them 
to up their game. 155 The history of Chinese economic reform attests to Naughton’s 
theory.  
 
When China embarked on market reform in 1978, the Chinese economy was 
predominantly controlled by the Chinese State.156  All prices and quantities were 
determined under a centrally planned system modeled after the former Soviet Union. 
There is little doubt that at the time the Chinese economy was run like a giant China, 
Inc., but such a business model is beset with serious agency problems. Because the 
input and output prices were determined by the Chinese government, it was 
impossible for the government to evaluate the performance of the SOEs’ management 
or to discipline the managers by simply observing the firm’s profitability.157 To tackle 
this problem, the government introduced a series of SOE reforms starting in the 
1980s, with the main agenda of granting autonomy to SOEs to motivate them to 
pursue profit and growth.158 Decisions permitting SOEs to sell some of their outputs 
to the market and to source some of their inputs from the market partially contributed 
                                                
152 ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI & COLE KYLE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES AND STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA 26 (2011), available at 
http://sites.utexas.edu/chinaecon/files/2015/06/US-China-Commission_State-Owned-Enterprises-and-
State-Capitalism.pdf  (For instance, while Chinese statistics indicate that SOEs exceeded 100,000 in 
2010, the number of SOEs controlled by the central government was only 120 that year. Regional 
governments controlled all the remaining numbers).  
153 See generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, 
1978–1993 (1995) (discussing how, even with no democratization and a limited period of political 
relaxation, Chinese economic progress was able to continue). 
154 Id. at 8–11. 
155 See generally id. at 200–43 (explaining how the entry of non-state actors was critical for the overall 
process of marketization, as they helped ensure the healthy development of the market sphere). 
156 Xiaodong Zhu, Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present and Future, 26 J ECON. PERSPECTIVE 
103, 114 (2012).  
157 See Justin Yifu Lin et al., Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-Owned Enterprise Reform, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 422, 423 (1998) (explaining how the influence of the managers’ actions on the 
profitability of an SOE was secondary to the input and output prices controlled by the state). 
158 BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 92 (2007). 
	   24 
to the growth of non-state firms, especially the ownership and village enterprises 
(TVEs). 159  The successes of these TVEs in turn exerted significant competitive 
pressures on the SOEs, thus further triggering the Chinese government to deepen 
economic reform.160 Empirical evidence shows that the managerial incentives and the 
total factor productivity of SOEs were significantly improved due to the increase in 
management autonomy and the competitive pressures from TVEs.161 The profits of 
Chinese SOEs declined sharply, however, as they could no longer derive monopoly 
rents in many markets.162 This provided the impetus for China to conduct a round of 
privatization in the late 1990s, resulting in a massive reduction of SOEs between 1994 
and 2000.163 Large SOEs also underwent a partial privatization by listing some of 
their best assets in domestic and foreign stock exchanges.164 
 
Market reform is not yet complete in China, and SOEs still maintain a powerful 
presence in the Chinese economy. Meanwhile, China is a vast country with a huge 
bureaucracy.165 As each component of the bureaucracy may have its own bureaucratic 
interest, the goal of the Chinese State is not necessarily coherent when it comes to the 
economic policy of SOEs. Although SASAC is a product of China’s market reform, it 
has also emerged as a powerful and vocal bureaucratic department vying for the 
interests of the SOEs. 166  Central SASAC’s clear objective is to encourage the 
consolidation of SOEs and turn them into “national champions,” as this is directly 
related to its own bureaucratic interest.167 The growth of the SOEs signals the strength 
of Chinese state capitalism, and the entrenched interest of these giant SOEs helps 
further enhance the interests of SASAC as a state asset management bureaucracy. 
 
At the same time, other bureaucratic departments have different policy goals. For 
instance, the Price Supervision and the Anti-Monopoly Bureau within the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is tasked with controlling price 
inflation and tackling anticompetitive conduct. If prices are too high, this will 
destabilize the whole economic system and may even lead to political turmoil that 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of the governing party.168 However, because prices are 
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liberalized, the agency has very limited tools to achieve its aim to control prices.169  
Antitrust was then viewed as an effective tool to discipline the high prices charged by 
firms, including SOEs.170 This is most evident by looking at the record of Chinese 
antitrust enforcement. For example, in 2011, NDRC announced its investigation into 
China Telecom and China Unicom, the two largest SOEs in the telecommunication 
industry.171  Other frequent targets are local SOEs, such as premium white liquor 
manufacturers, gold retailers in Shanghai, large cement manufacturers, insurance 
companies, auto manufacturers, and so on.172 
 
The utility function of the Chinese State is therefore highly complex. On the one 
hand, the government endorses competition and has liberalized most of its economic 
sectors over the past few decades. In those liberalized sectors, the Chinese 
government allows non-State firms to compete freely with SOEs.173 On the other 
hand, power is fragmented within the Chinese bureaucracy and each governmental 
department has its own departmental interest in promoting or limiting competition for 
SOEs. SASAC, for instance, advocates for the expansion of the State sector and 
endorses the monopoly positions held by the largest Chinese SOEs. This is often at 
odds with market reform and discourages competition from private companies. It also 
clashes with the objectives of other departments, such as the antitrust unit within 
NDRC, which advocates for consumer welfare.  
 
(2)   The Limits of the Chinese State 
Antitrust takes for granted that a controlling owner can coordinate firms within its 
control. It assumes that the owner can dictate the firm’s actions. However, when the 
owner is a State, the question is more nuanced. Two inherent problems in the Chinese 
economy have made it extremely difficult for the State to exercise effective control 
and coordinate the SOEs: (1) the highly decentralized Chinese economy and (2) the 
severe agency problems that exist in SOEs.  
 
(a)   The Decentralized Economy  
On the surface, the Chinese State is highly centralized and the Communist Party 
keeps a tight grip on every level of the Chinese government. But while political power 
is concentrated in Beijing, most of the rights of economic governance have been 
delegated to local governments. Chenggang Xu has characterized the Chinese 
economy as a “regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime,” where a 
centralized, one-party, authoritarian State presides over a dynamic, decentralized 
economy.174 Indeed, if we measure degree of decentralization by looking at statistics, 
China is the most decentralized country on earth.175 In 2008, local government’s share 
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of fiscal revenue and expenditure was forty percent and seventy-three percent 
respectively, far exceeding the OECD average of nineteen percent and thirty-two 
percent. 176  A recent empirical study found that local information is key to 
understanding the governance of SOEs in China. 177  Zhangkai Huang and his 
coauthors found that when the distance to the government is farther (and hence the 
government has less direct observation over the firm), the SOE is more likely to be 
decentralized (i.e. managed by a lower level of the government).178 However, such a 
link is muted when it comes to central SOEs in strategic industries.179 Notably, large 
centrally-owned SOEs only account for one third of the total number of SOEs in 
China and control slightly less than half of all the State assets.180 Consequently, most 
of the SOEs and the State assets belong to the local governments.  
 
Meanwhile, decentralization has been viewed as the driving force behind China’s 
phenomenal economic growth, despite the lack of good institutional support.181  First, 
local governments have incentives to foster their local businesses which are cronies of 
the local leaders.182 Formally, the success of the local businesses increases the tax 
revenues received by the local governments, expands the employment base, and helps 
the local government officials obtain political credits for economic achievements in 
their areas.183 Informally, local business owners can reward officials with bribes and 
even grant them stakes in the local business.184 Local officials thus become high-
power incentive agents with vested interests in the local businesses. Because China is 
a vast country, thousands of local governments are in effect competing with each 
other.185 While each local government is incentivized to erect barriers of entry to 
protect its own cronies, the existence of the competition from cronies fostered by 
other local governments counteracts the negative effects arising from local 
protectionism.186  
 
One example can be found in the automobile industry. The automobile industry is a 
tightly regulated sector where foreign car makers have to partner with Chinese 
domestic SOEs in order to access the Chinese market.187 The central government 
initially wanted to foster three large state-owned automobile manufacturers and was 
not willing to grant licenses to other companies.188 Thus, in the early 2000s, the 
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Chinese automobile market was dominated by a few large state-owned players who 
partnered with foreign firms, such as the partnership between Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Company and General Motors (SAIC-GM).189 However, since the 2000s, a 
number of small, startup car manufacturers, sponsored by the local governments, 
started to appear and become serious rivals to these large SOEs.190 One of them is 
Chery, which was started in 1997 by the Wuhan city government.191 Michael Dunne, 
a veteran in the Chinese auto industry, told the tale of how Chery was able to beat 
SAIC-GM with the launch of a new car model similar to the one that SAIC-GM had 
wanted to release.192 To be sure, both SAIC-GM and Chery are owned by the Chinese 
State, but they actually belong to different owners and are fierce competitors. 
 
While decentralization has promoted China’s astounding economic growth in the past 
few decades, it has also had undesirable consequences.  The Chinese government has 
faced severe overcapacity in many industry sectors. 193  Local governments are 
particularly reluctant to close down businesses, as this results in loss of GDP growth 
and employment, which also threatens the social stability in the region.194 Thus, local 
governments have incentives to prop up SOEs even if they are terminally ill.195 
Although the central government has repeatedly tried to orchestrate competition 
among SOEs in these sectors, it has often failed to do so.196 One example of this 
failure can be found in the steel industry. Despite numerous attempts to reduce 
competition among Chinese steel manufacturers, the severe problem of overcapacity 
remains. 197  Thus, the central government recently encouraged the tie-up between 
Baosteel and Wuhan Iron and Steel, two large state-owned steel makers.198 Clearly 
these two SOEs are not completely independent from the Chinese State since the State 
can influence their merger decisions. Yet, if the government could perfectly 
coordinate the competition among these two SOEs as if they were its own 
subsidiaries, there would be no need for these two SOEs to merge in the first place.  
 
The cases that the Commission has investigated so far are also good illustrations of 
economic fragmentation in China. In Bluestar/Elkem, the Commission found that the 
silicon market is highly fragmented with SOEs engaging in head-to-head competition 
with private firms.199 In fact, ChemChina is the only centrally owned SOE in the 
silicon metal market; the rest of the SOEs all belong to various local governments.200 
The evidence from the Commission’s market investigation also confirms that these 
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local SOEs and private firms are effective competitive constraints on ChemChina.201 
This seems to suggest that the fragmented nature of the market makes it costly for the 
government to coordinate these firms should it desire to do so. The Commission 
identified a similar phenomenon in DSM/Sinochem/JV, though the evidence gathered 
during that market investigation was mixed.202 To the extent that these two SOEs do 
compete, it would be problematic to treat them as a single entity for the purpose of 
antitrust assessment. True, the competition among these SOEs may have been fiercer 
had the government not intervened, but it is unequivocal that a merger between these 
SOEs would also reduce competition. 
 
Similarly, the Commission’s decision in the EDF/GCN case—which treats all SOEs 
in the energy sector as a single entity—is unnecessarily broad and fails to understand 
the competitive landscape of the energy sector. The energy sector is deemed highly 
important for the Chinese economy and falls within the “key” and “pillar” industries 
identified by SASAC. Energy, though, is a vast industry that includes oil, gas, 
electricity, nuclear power, coal, and renewable energy—many of which remain very 
fragmented. For instance, Nicolas Lardy, an expert on the Chinese economy, notes 
that in the coal mining sector alone there were 880 SOEs as of 2011. 203  Even 
assuming the Chinese government would like to coordinate the competition between 
these SOEs, the cost of coordination would be prohibitively high. Moreover, private 
firms exert competitive pressures on these SOEs. As pointed out by Lardy, trade 
liberation and foreign direct investment are also important competitive constraints on 
the SOEs.204  
 
(b)   Agency Problems 
Agency problems are not unique to SOEs, but they are particularly severe for SOEs. 
As Milhaupt and Pargendler have succinctly outlined, there are many unique 
challenges to the governance of SOES including the weak exit options enjoyed by 
citizens as opposed to shareholders and the collective action problem faced by the 
citizens in monitoring the SOEs, as well as the ambiguity of the objectives of the 
government’s pursuit and the means to achieve such objectives.205 
 
Agency problems are not unique to SOEs, but they are  particularly serious problems 
for Chinese SOEs due to the size and unique bureaucratic status of the entities. Many 
of the Chinese SOEs in the strategic sectors are among the largest companies in the 
world. These companies were spun off from large central ministries, which in turn 
dissolved and transferred most of the administrative, institutional, and personnel 
capacity to the SOEs. 206  Even though these SOEs continue to be subjected to 
regulation, the regulatory power over the industry tends to be fragmented, and the 
agencies often lack sufficient political clout and resources to effectively monitor 
them.207  In fact, some Chinese SOEs have captured industry regulators and have 
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come to dominate the government. 208 In these situations, regulatory agencies rely 
heavily on SOEs and defer to them for important policy questions.209  Moreover, 
Chinese SOEs still enjoy bureaucratic ranks, and the chairmen of the top fifty-three 
central SOEs enjoy a bureaucratic status parallel to either the head of the central 
SASAC or to a vice-ministerial rank.210 It is thus no surprise that in practice, SASAC 
finds itself lacking the political clout to effectively check these large SOEs.211   
 
In a previous article on Chinese outbound investment, I attributed empire-building as 
one important factor driving Chinese SOEs’ overseas forays.212 In China, the size of 
the SOE matters. The bigger it is, the more powerful it becomes; the more powerful it 
is, the easier it becomes for it to obtain resources to expand further and become even 
bigger.213 One example can be found in China’s oil and gas sector. China’s national 
oil companies (NOCs) are the most active players in overseas acquisitions.214 On the 
surface, the Chinese government seems to play a key role in coordinating the efforts 
of these NOCs in their quest for oil and natural gas assets; the reality, however, is that 
it was those NOCs that were driving their forays overseas.215 As pointed out by Erica 
Downs, a China energy expert, the political clout of an NOC is determined by the 
amount of the high quality assets that it possesses.216 The better the assets that an 
NOC acquires, the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic and financial assistance from 
the Chinese government for future investments. 217  This explains the lack of 
coordination among Chinese NOCs in their race for overseas expansion.218  
 
Indeed, problems of coordination have motivated SASAC to promote consolidation 
among large central SOEs in recent years.219 One example is the tie-up between two 
state-owned rolling stock companies, China CNR Corporation and CSR Corporation, 
into China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation.220 According to Chinese media, these 
two firms have engaged in cutthroat competition with each other in bidding overseas 
projects, and thus the transaction is expected to strengthen their competitive strength 
in international competition.221 In fact, since 2015, China has witnessed a new wave 
of mergers among Chinese SOEs. In addition to the CNR/CSR merger, another ten 
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mega-mergers between large Chinese SOEs have taken place in industries such as 
shipping, energy, commerce, construction, and steel. 222  Some economists have 
warned that the consolidation may even worsen the agency problem, as the Chinese 
government may have less bargaining power and find it even more difficult to control 
these corporate behemoths. 223  In any event, the European Union would have an 
interest in intervening in those transactions if they pose a threat to European 
consumers. However, the Commission would have no basis to do so if it adopts the 
view that Chinese SOEs are to be treated as one single entity.  
 
To rein in the rampant agency problems, President Xi Jingping has called for stronger 
and improved leadership for the CCP over SOEs since 2016.224 A series of policy 
documents have emerged granting the Party Committee within the SOEs more power 
to exercise oversight.225 Clearly, this is the government’s deliberate attempt to tighten 
political control over SOEs, but such control and influence does not necessarily 
translate into anticompetitive effects. The perennial challenge faced by Chinese 
leadership is how to strike the balance between granting autonomy to management in 
order to motivate them to pursue growth and profits, and ensuring good corporate 
governance so that State assets are not looted by management. For instance, it is well-
known that top Chinese SOEs have routinely rotated their senior corporate and party 
leaders.226 Some European academics have used this as an example of the Chinese 
government attempting to coordinate competition among them.227 While such rotation 
has obviously flouted the standard corporate law concept of the separate identity of 
the corporation, western scholars have overlooked the fact that the move was 
primarily motivated by a desire to curb nepotism and corruption.228 Top executives at 
large SOEs have enormous influence, and their most important source of power lies in 
their control of personnel. As such, long tenure at a large SOE enables the top 
executives to create a large personnel network within the firm. Those within the 
network collude with each other and share their risks and illegal profits.229 In a recent 
book on corruption in China, Minxin Pei investigated fifty cases and found that the 
buying and selling of appointments and promotions is a widespread practice in 
Chinese SOEs.230 A recent scandal at China National Petroleum Corporation, one of 
the largest state-owned oil firms, reveals how Jieming Jiang, the former chairman of 
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the firm who later briefly became the head of SASAC, stole a vast fortune from the 
State.231 
 
ii.   The Problem of Underinclusion 
Abundant economic studies have shown that minority shareholding in rival businesses 
can cause anticompetitive harm.232 However, there is currently a gap in addressing 
acquisitions of non-controlling interest at the E.U. level. 233  The EUMR defines 
control as the power to exercise decisive influence over a firm. Generally speaking, a 
firm will be deemed to have control over another firm if it owns more than half of the 
voting interest in that entity.234 Meanwhile, the Commission’s Jurisdictional Notice 
also recognizes de facto control through minority interest. 235  For instance, if a 
minority shareholder has the right to manage the activities of the company, or if the 
other shareholders are dispersed and small, then even a minority stake enables it to 
exercise control. 236  For joint ventures, control can also be established through 
deadlock situations where a minority shareholder can block a strategic commercial 
decision.237 However, falling short of establishing sole or joint control in the above 
circumstances, a minority investment would normally fall outside the jurisdiction of 
the EUMR.  
 
This has two implications for when the EUMR is applied to acquisitions by State 
investors. First, if a State investor acquires a significant but non-controlling interest in 
a European firm, then it would not be deemed to have acquired control in that firm. 
The transaction would not constitute a concentration and would not be subject to the 
EUMR. Second, if an SOE holds a significant but non-controlling right in a firm that 
is majority controlled by private investors, that firm would be treated as a privately 
owned firm (POE), rather than an SOE under the EUMR. If the POE then acquires 
control over a European firm, the SOE would not be deemed an ultimate controlling 
entity and would not be regarded as part of the same undertaking as the European firm. 
In the above two scenarios, the SOE directly or indirectly acquires a minority interest 
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in a European firm, but its involvement is completely outside the scrutiny of the 
EUMR.  
 
The concern about the gap in dealing with minority shareholding is not new, but 
acquisitions by Chinese SOEs pose a particular competition worry. Chinese SOEs are 
now among the largest companies in the world. In 2016, more than twenty percent of 
those who made the Fortune Global 500 List were Chinese companies, the  majority 
of which were State-owned. These SOEs not only have deep pockets, but also the 
government’s political and financial support to engage in overseas expansion. As 
these SOEs face heavy regulations in the domestic market, they are highly profit-
driven in their overseas expansion. These SOEs also show interest in investing in 
relatively concentrated industries, such as energy, high technology, utilities, and 
finance.238  
 
Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose an acquiring Chinese SOE has a 
subsidiary that competes with the target European firm in the same product market. 
The acquisition by the Chinese SOE could create incentives for the target to compete 
less aggressively in the relevant market. If the Chinese SOE raises prices and reduces 
the output of the target, some of the target’s customers will move to its competitors, 
but the Chinese SOE is entitled to a share of profits from its subsidiary. 
Anticompetitive effects, therefore, could arise when the SOE has the incentive and 
ability to heavily invest in a concentrated sector. Similarly, if a Chinese SOE has a 
minority interest in a POE, the SOE may find it profitable to raise prices and reduce 
output of its subsidiary. Even if some of its sales are shifted to the European target, it 
is entitled to a share of the POE’s profits. Coordinated effects also become more 
likely because of the common ownership of the Chinese SOE in both its subsidiary 
and the European target firm. Indeed, one may envisage that if western regulators, 
such as the Commission, tighten their scrutiny over Chinese SOEs, then Chinese 
SOEs may try to use POEs as vehicles for overseas acquisitions to obviate the 
Commission’s scrutiny.  
 
Some may be puzzled: if the Chinese State may lack the incentive and ability to 
coordinate those SOEs in which it holds majority controls, would not it be even less 
likely for SOEs to coordinate firms in which they only have minority interests? Not 
necessarily. There is a fundamental difference between the Commission’s concerns 
regarding the coordination among Chinese SOEs and minority shareholding by 
Chinese SOEs. The former was built on the premise that the State (via central or local 
SASACs) would coordinate competition among ostensibly independent SOEs, 
whereas the latter assumes that a single SOE would coordinate firms that it partially 
owns. Although the incentive and the ability of SASAC to coordinate a large number 
of SOEs belonging to multiple levels of government in different regions is 
ambiguous, as elaborated in Part (II)(i), the incentive and ability of a SOE to do so is 
firmly grounded in economic circumstances, as discussed below.  
 
(1)   Direct Acquisition of Minority Interest  
Minority shareholding is an increasingly popular means of investment for Chinese 
SOEs when they expand overseas. Annex I provides a list of the minority shares (less 
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than fifty percent) that Chinese companies have invested in Europe since 2005.239 As 
shown in the list, some of the largest deals made by Chinese firms in Europe in recent 
years are minority acquisitions, including ChemChina and SAFE’s $7.86 billion 
investment in Pirelli.240 Even though these Chinese SOEs did not acquire majority 
control over the European assets, such investments may nonetheless pose competition 
concerns.  
 
State Grid, a Chinese SOE under the supervision of central SASAC, offers a prime 
example. State Grid now ranks as the world’s largest public utility company by 
revenue and was the second-largest company on the Fortune 500 List in 2016, 
generating over $50 billion in cash that year. 241 Since 2011, it has made several high-
profile acquisitions in Western Europe, all of which are minority interests.242 Its first 
acquisition was made in 2012, when it purchased a twenty-five percent stake in Redes 
Energeticas Nacionais (Ren), the largest energy network in Portugal.243 State Grid 
became an active investor in Ren and sent senior executives to participate in the 
firm’s management.244 State Grid is now the single largest shareholder in Ren, which 
has a fragmented share structure with thirty-five percent shares public and the rest 
held by seven investors.245 Two years later, State Grid spent $2.8 billion to acquire a 
thirty-five percent interest in Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, an Italian energy grid unit.238 
State Grid also actively participates in the management and controls two of the five 
seats on the board of directors of the Italian grid .246   
 
In the past year, State Grid attempted to make a further foray into Western Europe. In 
June 2016, it won a bid to acquire a fourteen percent stake in Eandis Assets, a Belgian 
gas and power distribution firm. 247  The deal was later blocked by the Belgian 
authority, citing a concern over the possible takeover of the distribution networks by 
the Chinese investors248 Notably, the deal would have given State Grid only three 
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seats on the forty-member board of directors.249 In late 2016, State Grid purchased a 
twenty-four percent stake of ADMIE, a Greek power transmission company.250 State 
Grid’s expansion into Europe is highly strategic. According to China Daily, State 
Grid is “considering building an ultra-high-voltage global power network to transmit 
electricity from country to country and continent to continent, a goal that may cost 
$50 trillion to develop by 2050.” 251  So far, State Grid has boosted its overseas 
investment to over $10 billion in regions including Europe, South American, and Asia, 
and it is expected to increase its investment to $50 billion by 2020.252 State Grid’s 
minority acquisitions in Europe seem to be the starting points for its ultimate vision to 
build a global power super-grid.253 Thus far, it is not entirely clear if European firms 
that State Grid has invested in compete with each other, as energy distribution 
networks tend to be natural monopolies. However, when such networks become more 
integrated within the European Union, 254  there is a foreseeable risk that these 
networks would compete with each other.  
 
Importantly, even if the SOE never casts a vote to sway management, its minority 
investment could harm competition under certain circumstances, especially if the firm 
invests in concentrated sectors. As long-standing antitrust literature has shown, 
passive investment without voting power could cause anticompetitive harm. 255   
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) pose a particular concern, as they regularly invest in 
minority interests. 256  Empirical studies have also found that SWFs are not pure 
passive investors, and in many instances, they actively monitor their investments or 
seek to influence those firms’ commercial activities.257  Moreover, because SWFs 
possess superior information due to their proximity to the government and are able to 
influence government policies in ways that may benefit SWFs, investors of the target 
firm generally react positively to a SWF’s investment and negatively to a SWF’s 
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divestment.258 As such, even if an SWF possesses no formal voting interest in a firm, 
management could have an incentive to cater to the SWF’s preference, as the loss of 
the SWF’s long-term investment could send a bad signal to the market and adversely 
affect the firm’s stock performance.259 
 
Take China Investment Corporation (CIC) as an example. As the official SWF from 
China, the fund ranked the fourth-largest in 2016.260 CIC’s operation is very opaque 
with little public disclosure about its investment activities. However, information 
gathered by intelligence agencies has revealed some of its footprints in recent years. 
Since its establishment in 2007, CIC has been aggressively making investments 
overseas.261 Based on the data collected by the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Heritage Foundation, CIC has invested widely in the financial, energy, real estate, and 
agriculture industries.262 In Europe, CIC has invested in real estate, energy, utilities, 
technology, and transport industries.263 CIC often acquires a significant interest in 
targets,264and, notably, does not simply adopt a passive investment strategy. Since 
2010, CIC has gained influence on the board of four companies in which it has 
acquired a stake of ten percent or more.265   
 
Moreover, despite the fact that in most circumstances CIC has limited control rights 
over companies in its portfolio, scholars have suggested that CIC is able to exert 
influence beyond its formal corporate rights. 266  This is because CIC’s close 
connection with the Chinese government is often viewed as an important strategic 
asset for its portfolio companies, especially when the latter are contemplating 
expansion into the Chinese market or partnership with other Chinese SOEs.267 For 
instance, after CIC’s investment in GDF Suez in 2011, the two firms agreed to a plan 
of strategic cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region. 268  Subsequently, GDF Suez 
entered into several high-profile cooperation projects with leading Chinese state-
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owned energy firms.269 Thus, to determine an SWF’s actual influence over a portfolio 
company, competition regulators cannot solely rely upon the formal corporate rights 
of the SWF. Indeed, if Chinese SWFs continue to invest in highly concentrated 
markets, there will be a foreseeable risk that this would give rise to anticompetitive 
concerns similar to those generated by U.S. institutional shareholders. Wrestling with 
the concept of China, Inc. in those circumstances is unhelpful, as it eschews the 
fundamental question about the anticompetitive effects of State ownership.  
 
(2)   Indirect Acquisition of Minority Interest  
The policy debate on Chinese state capitalism has so far been fixated on the Chinese 
SOEs. However, as Milhaupt and Zheng note in an insightful article, “[D]rawing a 
stark distinction among Chinese firms based on the ownership of enterprise (SOE 
versus POE) to frame Chinese state capitalism . . . misperceives the reality of that 
country’s institutional environment . . . .” 270 Chinese state capitalism is manifested in 
a highly diverse form of ownership. Although Chinese SOEs have undergone several 
rounds of privatization, many of them did not completely sell off their State assets and 
instead became firms with mixed ownership.271 Mixed ownership enterprises (MOEs) 
have a substantial presence in the Chinese economy. 272  According to an annual 
industrial survey, MOEs accounted for twenty percent of the total number of 
industrial firms from 2004 to 2010. 273  Economists have estimated that MOEs 
constitute about forty percent of the Chinese economy in terms of assets and industrial 
value added.274  
 
Indeed, there is a trend that the line between SOEs and POEs will become 
increasingly blurred in China. At the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Central 
Committee in 2013, the Chinese government endorsed the market economy and 
advocated for mixed ownership reform, which is intended to promote cross-holding 
and mutual fusion between public and private capital. 275  Since 2014, Chinese 
governments at all levels have started to adopt guidelines and plans to convert SOEs 
into MOEs.276 This reform intends to bring further market disciplines to the SOEs, 
thereby improving their financial performance and productivity.277  To be sure, since 
the State’s financial interest in the MOEs has been diluted, the State’s control over the 
firms has been weakened. However, the Chinese State is not an ordinary investor. It 
not only plays the role of an investor, but also of a financier and a regulator. Thus, the 
State’s power and influence over an MOE could far exceed what a common minority 
shareholder can wield over a firm.  
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Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that Firm A is an SOE controlled by the 
local SASAC. Firm A holds a significant but non-controlling interest in Firm B, while 
the rest of its stock is held by private investors. Suppose that Firm B acquires sole 
control of a European Firm C. Meanwhile, Firm A has a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Firm D, that competes with Firm C. Pursuant to the EUMR, the Commission will 
consider Firm C and D as independent competitors in the market, despite the common 
ownership by Firm A. However, Firm A’s minority interest in Firm B will soften the 
competition between Firms C and D, especially if they operate in a highly 
concentrated market. Notably, Firm A may be able to exert such influence not only 
directly through its ownership, but also indirectly through alternative means such as 
financing or attractive strategic cooperation opportunities. Suppose that Firm E, 
another subsidiary of Firm A, offers to help Firm B finance its acquisition. In return 
for the cheap financing provided by Firm E, the other shareholders of Firm B agree to 
the strategic alliance between Firms C and D, thus further facilitating and reinforcing 
the collusion between these two firms. This example shows the risk of coordination 
posed by minority state ownership as the Chinese State has more resources than 
private firms to facilitate collusion.   
 
A recent Chinese investment highlights such a risk, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. In 
2016, Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund (FGC) attempted to acquire Aixtron, a 
German semiconductor equipment maker. 278  FGC is forty-nine percent held by 
Xiamen Bohao, another fund controlled by Xiamen municipal government, and the 
other fifty-one percent is held by Liu Zhengdong, a Chinese citizen.279 According to 
the New York Times, a web of intricate relationships was suspected to be behind 
FGC.280 First, San’an Optoelectronics, also based in the same province as FGC, has 
been a big customer of Aixtron.281 In 2015, San’an suddenly canceled a large order at 
the last minute, causing Aixtron’s stock prices to crash.282  This sparked speculation 
that FGC had coordinated with San’an to orchestrate the abrupt price crash. Reporters 
were able to identify some commonality of interest between Bohao and San’an, 
including a preexisting financial relationship and a common shareholder by a State-
run investment fund based in Xiamen.283 Moreover, Sino IC Leasing, in which San’an 
has a five percent interest,284 helped FGC finance the deal.285 Further, a national 
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State-investment fund held an eleven percent interest in San’an286 and was also an 
owner of Sino IC Leasing.287 There could be nothing wrong with these links between 
a large customer and a potential acquirer of Aixtron, but these intricate relationships 
raise serious suspicions about the actual independence of these companies. Indeed, 
these multiple layers of common ownership by various local and national State funds 
provide the structural link between Bohao, a minority shareholder of the acquirer, and 
San’an, a large customer of the target. Yet, the involvement of those SOEs is probably 
outside antitrust scrutiny in the European Union, as they only hold minority interest in 
the parties involved.  
 
 
 
This transaction also highlights the risk of coordination among Chinese SOEs. Since 
2014, the Chinese government has been aggressively promoting the development of a 
robust domestic semiconductor capability with the goal of becoming a leader in the 
industry by 2030.288 Massive national and local state funds were raised to finance the 
investment and acquisitions in this sector.289 The Aixtron transaction is an example of 
the overseas acquisitions by such State-sponsored funds, with the government 
providing generous financing to facilitate such a move. For instance, in addition to 
support from the National State-investment fund, FGC also received financing from 
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the China Development Bank in Xiamen and the Agricultural Bank in Shanghai.290 
While this may suggest that the Chinese government is facilitating the acquisition 
behind the scenes, it is extremely hard to identify evidence of explicit communication 
among these funds. It is also difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to show that the 
government has coordinated their activities.  
 
The Aixtron deal also illustrates the difficulties antitrust regulators would face in 
handling a similar transaction. For example, one such difficulty is the opacity of the 
SOE’s investment in a transaction. On first impression, FGC is majority-controlled by 
Zhengdong Liu, a Chinese businessman; however, there has been much suspicion in 
the West about whether Liu does indeed control the fifty-one percent shares he owns 
on paper.291 Liu has kept a very low profile during the acquisition, and a glance at his 
resume shows that he has mostly invested in mining business—it is not entirely clear 
why he would want to expand his investment into the semiconductor industry.292 A 
number of Chinese news reports have suggested that the real supporter behind Mr. 
Liu is Huaxin Fund, another State-owned fund in the semiconductor industry.293   
 
Notably, the potential competition issue among these Chinese entities has been 
addressed by the U.S. and German governments on national security grounds. The 
U.S. government has been vigilant about China’s aggressive expansion into the 
semiconductor industry.294 Because Aixtron has some assets in the United States, the 
deal was blocked by the United States government on national security grounds.295 
The German government also withdrew its approval for the transaction, citing 
concern about national security review. As elaborated in detail below, national 
security review can serve as an important complement to address the potential 
anticompetitive issue with Chinese state ownership.296   
 
III.   National Security Review as a Complement 
As analyzed in Part II, the application of the concept of an undertaking to SOEs could 
lead to both over-inclusive and under-inclusive outcomes. There is no easy solution to 
this problem, as it would require the Commission to simultaneously narrow and 
expand the concept of control under the EUMR, which is impossible to achieve 
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within the existing legal framework.  But the EUMR is not the only legal tool that can 
address the Commission’s concern. From a competition law perspective, what most 
concerns regulators is whether the Chinese State will acquire a critical block of 
ownership from Europe that would allow it to accumulate significant market power in 
a particular product market. Such an acquisition not only generates antitrust concerns, 
but it could also pose a threat to national security, especially when the acquisition 
would allow a single State to monopolize the supply of a strategic product or service.  
It should be noted that the line between strategic and non-strategic sectors is 
increasingly blurred. For example, in the United States, the Committee on Foreign 
Investment (CFIUS) has investigated acquisitions of meat-processing firms and 
cinema chains.297 When Pepsi was rumored to potentially acquire Danone, a dairy 
company and a source of national pride in France, it generated a huge political 
backlash within the French government.298  
 
There are several obvious advantages of using national security review to address 
anticompetitive concerns regarding coordination by SOEs belonging to the same 
State. First, it allows the regulator to conduct its investigation in a more 
comprehensive and flexible manner without compromising its future jurisdiction over 
potentially important cases involving SOEs. As I pointed out in an earlier paper, 
however, a rigid application of the concept of an undertaking to SOEs could lead to 
unintended consequences.299 If Chinese SOEs are deemed a single entity, then the 
Commission would not be able to intervene in cartels among Chinese SOEs or 
mergers between them. Given that many Chinese SOEs actively invest in European 
countries or export their products to European markets, the Commission would have 
an interest in intervening in such cases. For instance, if Chinese nuclear power 
companies collude when they sell to the European market, the Commission should 
intervene to protect the welfare of the consumers in Europe. But, the Commission’s 
existing position in EDF/CGN would jeopardize such legal action, as the Chinese 
nuclear companies could defend themselves on the basis that the coordination was a 
single firm’s conduct.   
 
Second, using national security review helps maintain the logical coherence of the 
Commission’s legal position. A logical interpretation of Recital 22 would require the 
Commission to focus on de facto, rather than de jure control when it analyze SOEs. 
However, the Commission seems to be applying a double standard. It used the de jure 
test in cases involving Chinese SOEs and the de facto test in cases involving 
European SOEs. Indeed, if the Commission insists upon using a de jure approach to 
deal with Chinese SOEs, then it should treat all Chinese SOEs—regardless of the 
sectors in which they operate, regardless of whether they are owned by the local or 
central government, and regardless of whether they actually compete with each 
other—as one single entity. Clearly such a conclusion is a stark contradiction with the 
economic reality in China today. Practically speaking, the de jure approach would 
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also create an undue burden for businesses, resulting in many superfluous and 
unnecessary merger notifications.  
 
Furthermore, experts in charge of national security would be in a superior position to 
antitrust regulators to assess the motives of a State and to navigate its complex 
political and economic institutions in order to determine the State’s ability to actually 
exert its influence over its SOEs. This would also allow the regulators to capture those 
cases in which the Chinese SOEs employ a non-controlling subsidiary as a vehicle to 
acquire European assets. Importantly, the concern that the Chinese State can 
strategically coordinate its SOEs to monopolize a certain product or service market is 
not just about economics, but also about politics. As the Aixtron transaction 
illustrates, competition regulators may not be able to rely on what they see on the 
surface to determine who is the ultimate controlling entity of the acquirer. An SOE 
can exert influence via various means and even an entity that seems privately-
controlled may actually be controlled by an SOE.300  
 
Finally, national security review reduces the risk of potential retaliation from the 
Chinese State. When the Commission tightens its antitrust scrutiny over Chinese 
firms, it should expect that China will respond in kind. China adopted an Anti-
Monopoly Law in 2007 and established a comprehensive merger review system 
similar to that of the European Union. Therefore, the Chinese authority cannot only 
exert jurisdiction over transactions involving the acquisition of a Chinese firm, but 
can also intervene in offshore transactions involving European firms. The 
enforcement record of the Chinese antitrust authority has shown that the Chinese 
merger review agency has significant discretion to impose remedies on large offshore 
merger transactions and has not shied away from blocking a transaction, even on 
dubious grounds.301 There is also the risk that the Chinese government may react 
strongly to the tightening of national security review. The difference, however, is that 
merger review casts a much wider net than national security review, as the former 
involves a burdensome ex ante screening process while the latter only intervenes 
when the deal poses a serious threat to national security.   
 
At the same time, despite the advantages of national security review, there is currently 
no foreign investment control at the E.U. level. Although such investment control 
may exist at the national level, investment security regimes vary widely across Europe. 
Countries such as France and Germany have established investment reviews used to 
address security concerns, whereas Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands do not have any investment measures related to public 
order and essential security considerations. 302  The European Union in general 
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endorses free trade, and it only allows its Member States to retain the right to impose 
restrictions on foreign investment based on public security considerations, as long as 
those restrictions do not result in arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
trade.303 Some policymakers are therefore concerned that the current patchwork of 
FDI rules at the E.U. Member State level risks sparking a race to the bottom, as some 
Member State authorities may rush to attract Chinese money and abandon attempts to 
screen security concerns.304 
 
In practice, such fear seems exaggerated. Recent acquisitions by Chinese companies 
in the strategic sectors have been subject to scrutiny at the Member State level. For 
instance, when EDF wanted to partner with CGN to build several nuclear power 
plants in Britain, the British government conducted rounds of intensive review of the 
transaction. 305  The deal eventually received the green light from the British 
government, with certain remedies imposed to address the potential national security 
concern.306 Midea, a Chinese electronics company, had to obtain clearance from both 
Germany’s Directorate of Defense Trade Control and CFIUS when it acquired Kuka, 
a German robot company.307 In 2016 alone, two Chinese investments stumbled in 
Europe due to national security concerns. In the first deal, the city of Antwerp 
blocked State Grid’s attempted acquisition of Eandis, a power distribution company 
based in Belgium.308 The Belgian authority allegedly received intelligence from the 
Belgian State Security Service warning of the links between State Grid, the CCP, and 
the military.309 This caused a Belgian Minister for energy to reverse his support for 
the deal.310 This case shows that even if Belgium has not established a formal national 
security review regime, the Belgian government can still block a deal on alternative 
regulatory grounds.  
 
Similarly, in the face of growing protectionist backlash against Chinese investment, 
the German government withdrew its approval for the acquisition of Aixtron in 
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October 2016.311 According to existing German law, the German Economic Ministry 
has the authority to review any deals where non-E.U. investors acquire at least 
twenty-five percent of the voting right of a German company and must block the deal 
if it “poses a threat to Germany’s public order or security.”312 The concept of “public 
order or security” is vague and can be interpreted to cover a large number of industry 
sectors. Notably, as many multinational companies operate on a global scale, Chinese 
acquisitions of European assets are not only vetted by target countries in the European 
Union, but also in other countries such as the United States. A good example is the 
previously-mentioned Aixtron deal where CFIUS exerted jurisdiction over the 
transaction on the basis of Aixtron’s assets in the United States.313 In another 2016 
deal, a consortium of Chinese investors failed to acquire Opera Software, a 
Norwegian browser company, because it did not obtain the requisite approval from 
CFIUS.314   
 
As illustrated above, national security review has provided a much more intrusive and 
flexible intervention into Chinese investment in Europe. To the extent that the 
Chinese State can acquire substantial strategic assets in Europe and accumulate  
significant market power, or even become a monopoly in the E.U. or global market, 
this would certainly trigger national security review by E.U. Member States or other 
countries such as the United States. That said, the interests of the European Union and 
some of its Member States might not entirely align, and there could be a situation 
where a Member State may welcome Chinese investment but the European Union 
does not. In 2011, Antonio Tajani, a former European Commissioner for Industry and 
Entrepreneurship, called for an E.U.-wide foreign investment review to protect 
European know-how and technology from Chinese investors. 315  The European 
Parliament echoed such concerns and called for a European body to conduct an ex 
ante evaluation of strategic investment by foreign companies, similar to CFIUS.316 
However, the establishment of such an E.U.-wide body analogous to CFIUS is likely 
to be met with significant opposition from some Member States who are reluctant to 
cede their jurisdictions to the E.U. government. Since the Commission is already 
empowered to conduct merger review at the E.U. level, some have suggested that 
E.U. competition policy could be a convenient tool to strengthen the monitoring of 
Chinese FDI.317 However, such should not be an excuse for the Commission to block 
investments based on improper antitrust grounds.   
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IV.   Conclusion 
Despite decades of market reform, China remains a State-dominated economy in 
which the CCP maintains pervasive control over the SOEs. But, this is only one side 
of the story. Market reform has also resulted in a dynamic private sector which 
competes fiercely with SOEs in the liberalized sectors. Moreover, the Chinese State, 
due to its sheer size, its vast and intricate bureaucracy, and its highly decentralized 
economic system, has a different utility function than what is commonly assumed 
about a commercial entity, and there is a limit on what the State can do. Too often, 
western policymakers and academics ignore this facet.  
 
The Commission’s recent regulatory response to Chinese acquisitions illustrates such 
a misconception. During its antitrust review of the merger transactions involving 
Chinese SOEs, the Commission has focused on analyzing the possibility of the 
Chinese State influencing its SOEs. This assessment misses the point. If a State 
retains voting power in its SOEs, it will always have the power to influence their 
commercial decisions. This is true for all SOEs, regardless of their nationalities. The 
real question is not whether a State can control SOEs, but whether it does. Indeed, in 
previous cases involving European SOEs, the Commission focused on de facto 
control by the State, but it shifted its standard to de jure control when scrutinizing 
Chinese cases.318 In this regard, the Commission appears to be applying a double 
standard to Chinese SOEs.  
 
Thus far, the Commission’s has focused on defining the scope of China, Inc. involved 
in the transaction. The problem, however, is that there is no clear distinction between 
ownership and control for Chinese firms. Consequently, a bright-line approach would 
result in both over-inclusive and under-inclusive outcomes. Moreover, from an 
economic standpoint, the extent to which coordination by the Chinese State has 
lessened competition is a quantitative question, rather than a qualitative one. 
Therefore, a thoughtful response to the acquisitions by Chinese SOEs would require 
the regulator to shift its focus from defining the undertaking to understanding the 
effects of Chinese State ownership. This, however, is far from an easy task. Since the 
Commission’s current approach towards dealing with Chinese SOE cases carries 
grave legal risks for itself and causes significant uncertainties for businesses, I caution 
against deploying competition policy too broadly in reviewing Chinese SOE 
acquisitions. Instead, national security review could be employed as a useful 
complement to antitrust review.  
 
 
 
  
                                                
318 See infra Part (I)(iii).  
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Annex I 
 
List of Acquisitions of Minority Interests in Europe by Chinese Firms (2006-2015)  
Year 
Chinese 
Investor 
 
 
Quantity 
in 
Millions 
Share 
Size Target Sector Country 
2006 
China 
Development 
Bank $800 1% Anglo-American Metals Britain 
2007 
China 
Development 
Bank $3,040 3% Barclays Finance Britain 
2007 Ping An $2,700 4% Fortis Finance Belgium 
2008 SAFE $2,800 2% Total Energy France 
2008 SAFE $2,010 1% BP Energy Britain 
2009 CIC $370 1% Diageo Britain 
2009 CIC $450 19% Songbird Estates Real estate Britain 
2009 Unicom $1,000 1% Telefonica Technology Spain 
2010 CIC $960 2% Apax Finance Finance Britain 
2011 
China 
Unicom $500 1% Telefonica Technology Spain 
2011 Fosun $120 10% Folli Follie Other Greece 
2011 CIC $3,240 30% GDF Suez Energy France 
2011 SAFE $720 3% Munich Re Finance Germany 
2011 
Three 
Gorges $3,510 21% 
Energias de 
Portugal Energy Portugal 
2012 CIC $920 9% Thames Water Utilities Britain 
2012 Sinochem $260 35% Siat Energy Belgium 
2012 State Grid $510 25% REN Energy Portugal 
2012 SAFE $200 10% Veolia Water Utilities Britain 
2012 CIC $490 7% Eutelsat Technology France 
2012 Sinopec $1,500 49% Talisman Energy Energy Britain 
2012 
Shandong 
Heavy $930 25% Kion Real estate Germany 
2012 CIC $730 10% Heathrow Holding Transport Britain 
2012 
Three 
Gorges $470 49% Renovaveis Energy Portugal 
2012 Zoomlion $240 40% 
Compagnia 
Italiana Forme 
Acciaio Real estate Italy 
2013 
China 
Merchants $530 49% CMA CGM Transport France 
2013 SAFE $110 49% One Angel Square Real estate Britain 
2013 SAFE $840 40% UPP Group Real estate Britain 
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2013 HNA $310 20% NH Hoteles Tourism Spain 
2013 Fosun $360 46% Club Med Tourism France 
2013 
Henan Civil 
Aviation $220 35% Cargolux Airlines Transport Luxembourg 
2014 Dongfeng $1,100 14% Pugeot Transport France 
2014 Fosun $140 19% BHF Finance Germany 
2014 
China Power 
Investment $440 33% EneMalta Energy Malta 
2014 
Shanghai 
Electric $560 40% Ansaldo Energia Energy Italy 
2014 SAFE $170 49% Statkraft Energy Britain 
2014 SAFE $520 2% Telecom Italia Technology Italy 
2014 SAFE $110 2% Prysiam Technology Italy 
2014 SAFE $280 2% Fiat Transport Italy 
2014 Fosun $110 23% Tom Tailor Other Germany 
2014 SAFE $630 2% Generali Finance Italy 
2014 SAFE $140 2% Mediobanco Finance Italy 
2014 State Grid $2,500 35% CDP Reti Energy Italy 
2014 SAFE $100 2% Saipem Energy Italy 
2014 
Shandong 
Hi-Speed $190 25% 
Friedmann Pacific 
Asset Management Transport France 
2015 Fosun $140 5% 
Thomas Cook 
Group Tourism Britain 
2015 CEFC $100 5% J&T Finance Finance 
Czech 
Republic 
2015 
Jin Jiang 
Hotels $430 4% Accor Hotels Tourism France 
2015 
ChemChina 
and SAFE $7,860 
26, 
26% Pirelli Transport Italy 
2015 SAFE $1,220 2% Intesa Sanpaolo Finance Italy 
2015 SAFE $820 2% Unicredit Finance Italy 
2015 
Guangdong 
Midea $170 5% Kuka Germany 
2015 CEFC $100 5% J&T Finance Finance 
Czech 
Republic 
2015 CITIC $670 25% 
Royal Albert 
Docks Real estate Britain 
2015 
China 
Minsheng 
Investment $130 34% Luxaviation Transport Luxembourg 
2015 
China Media 
Capital and 
CITIC $400 13% 
City Football 
Group Britain 
2016 ChemChina $360 12% Mercuria Energy Switzerland 
2016 
Jin Jiang 
Hotels $110 2% Accor Tourism France 
2016 
Jin Jiang 
Hotels $450 6% Accor Tourism France 
	   47 
2016 
Guangdong 
Midea $140 5% Kuka Germany 
2016 CEFC $1,020 40% J&T Finance Finance 
Czech 
Republic 
2016 
Jin Jiang 
Hotels $280 3% Accor Tourism France 
2016 
Guangdong 
Midea $150 3% Kuka Germany 
2016 
China Ocean 
Shipping $140 35% 
Euromax Terminal 
Rotterdam Transport Netherlands 
2016 COSCO $1,440 49% Nidera Netherlands 
2016 State Grid $350 24% Public Power Energy Greece 
2016 Fosun $180 17% 
Banco 
Commercial 
Portugures Finance Portugal 
2016 
Jiangsu 
Shagang led 
consortium $2,960 49% Global Switch Technology Britain 
2016 CIC $1,780 11% National Grid Energy Britain 
 
 
Source: American Enterprise Institute & the Heritage Foundation319 
 
 
                                                
319 Am. Enter. Inst. & Heritage Found., supra note 238.  
